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This study measures the economic consequences of information security 
activities, in general, and more specifically the market value of disclosures of 
information security activities.  Since information security activities are primarily 
non-revenue generating, management tends to view them as the cost-of-doing-
business, with no impact on firm value.  Furthermore, managers are reluctant to share 
the details, because that they do not want to attract the attention of hackers.  However, 
voluntary disclosures of information security can help reduce information asymmetry, 
which leads to belief revisions by investors, and hence corrects the misspecifications 
(if any) of the firm’s market value.  In other words, voluntary disclosures of security 
  
activities are signaling mechanisms.  The objective of this dissertation is to develop a 
taxonomy of disclosures of information security activities, and empirically test the 
value relevance of such disclosures.  Based on a sample of 1,637 disclosing firms, the 
empirical results provide support for the argument that voluntary disclosures of 
information security activities are value-relevant.  Industry-wide analyses support the 
disclosure taxonomy developed, and highlight that firms which are technology and 
data-dependent, have the most impact from these discretionary disclosures of 
information security activities.  These results are robust to various sensitivity checks, 
including matched-pair design, returns model, and the model that corrects for self-
selection bias. 
 The main contributions of this research are three-fold: 1) it adds to the 
discretionary disclosure literature by supporting the signaling hypothesis, 2) it adds to 
the extant literature on value-relevance vis-à-vis the importance of intangible 
voluntary disclosures, and 3) it adds to the information security literature concerning 
the value of information security-related activities to organizations.  Future directions 
highlight the rich stream of potential research, based on the dataset collected as a part 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Increased interconnectivity among computers enabled by networking 
technologies, in particular the Internet, has dramatically increased the scale and scope 
of information technology (IT) related crimes.  Specifically, as E-commerce 
continues to grow, so does cyber-related crime.  One of the reasons why cyber-crimes 
increase, is the fact that companies need to ‘open’ their IT assets to their supply chain 
participants, such as vendors and/or customers in order to garner the benefits of 
enhanced computerization and connectivity.  However, by allowing online (real time) 
access, the organizations are providing potential entry points that can then be used 
against the firm for malicious activities; in other words, firms are now more 
vulnerable to information security breaches.  Previously, where the only concern was 
the ‘trusted’ employee who might cause harm, now firms have to deal with unknown 
outside threats as well.  These reasons are forcing the firm to view information 
security from an entirely new perspective.  Whereas IT security was once considered 
an overhead, it is now being viewed as an important part of daily business operations 
(Cagnemi 2001).  
In the ‘new-economy,’ ‘information’ in various forms like trademarks, 
proprietary software, patents, trade secrets, customized expert systems, and in-house 
databases, is considered an asset that provides the firm its competitive advantage.  
Accordingly, the need to protect information has become all the more critical for a 




potential of substantial economic/reputation loss, the need for development and 
enforcement of internal controls becomes all the more critical (Gordon and Loeb 
2002a). That is, firms are continuously in pursuit of protecting their proprietary 
information (confidentiality), preserving integrity of their databases (integrity), and 
ensuring information access to authorized users (access control).  Broadly stated, 
these three activities are defined to construe information security of a firm. 
 On the other hand, information security product vendors are experiencing a 
bonanza.  By capitalizing on the media frenzy of security breaches, these vendors are 
continuously trying to sell high-priced products.  The firms are in a dilemma.  Should 
they spend more on information security technology (knowing that these investments 
have unproven return on investment’s), or alternatively (without extra investment) 
what is the best way to secure their information assets?  Further compounding the 
issue is the fact that security-related investments are primarily non-revenue 
generating.  In other words, there is no positive outcome (at least not readily) 
available for reporting or comparison.  More to the point, “the more successful the 
[security] project, the less likely you are to see breaches [outcomes]” (Gordon and 
Loeb 2002b, p. 30).  Hence, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for 
organizations to quantify benefits. Although not the focus of this dissertation, 
information security activities could generate revenue by providing a competitive 
advantage for a firm (see e.g., Gordon and Loeb 2003).  Furthermore, a recent survey 
of the state of information security by Berinato and Ware (2003), shows that 




firms that had spent less. Thus, with such conflicting issues, managers are not sure 
what to do. 
The importance of information security is further highlighted by the 2005 
survey of the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).  The CSI/FBI survey reported that 56% of respondents detected an 
unauthorized use of their computer system within the last year, and the average 
estimated loss (for organizations that provided estimates) was over US$ 200,000.  
However, over the previous year – 2004, the average losses per firm declined 
substantially by 61% (Gordon et al. 2005). Moreover, for the year 2005, despite the 
overall decrease in losses for unauthorized access and theft of information categories, 
the average losses per respondent increased dramatically to US$ 303,234 and 
US$ 355,552, respectively.  However, the survey cautions that “the difficulty in 
interpreting [the] overall downward trend is compounded by the difficulty of 
accurately measuring the implicit costs of losses associated with certain crimes” 
(Gordon et al. 2005, p. 15). Interestingly, 95% of the reporting organizations claimed 
that they have experienced more than 10 website security breach incidents.  In a Wall 
Street Journal Special Report on workplace security, 82% of the firms detected a 
virus attack where the prime source of these viruses was email attachments (86%) 
that caused an estimated financial loss of about US$ 27 million (Wall Street Journal 
2003, p. R3).  
The CSI/FBI survey (Gordon et al. 2005) also notes that the top two reasons 
cited by organizations not to disclose security breach are that the negative publicity of 




breach information to their advantage. The fear of negative stock market reaction was 
corroborated by a recent study by Campbell et al. (2003), where the authors 
empirically shows that there is a significant negative market reaction (reduced stock 
prices) for firms that suffer a security breach (specifically if the breach is of a 
confidential nature) by as much as 5%.  Therefore, it seems that companies that are 
experiencing security intrusions (even though they have taken effective steps to 
mitigate the problem) are not comfortable in sharing the details about information 
security breaches.  
Casey (2004) states the interesting point that it seems unfair to punish the 
organizations that have already experienced a security breach. However, he goes on 
to point out that it is a credibility issue with the organizations who remain silent after 
experiencing a security incident, because of significant costs that might accrue to the 
people whose information is compromised (identify theft).  Additionally, customers 
might indirectly be affected as well, since they would bear the increased cost of doing 
business with such organizations that would try to recuperate these losses.  As such, 
the general ethical recourse should be to share the security breach information.  
As for disclosing an organization’s security activities and/or measures, the 
senior managers face a paradox.  If they report that they are concerned about security 
and disclose flaws that they may have, or if they release that the organization is 
secure with all the possible safeguards in place, then they are setting themselves up 
for a security attack in either situation.  Gordon et al. (2003) explore the dynamics of 
security information sharing alliances. Using an analytical economic model, Gordon 




Nevertheless, they caution that for information sharing to happen, economic 
incentives have to be established, otherwise participants would tend to free-ride as 
opposed to contribute information.  Lack of economic incentives, restrains the firm to 
be the first mover in the information-sharing alliance.  Therefore, the management is 
living by the old World War II mantra of “Loose lips sink ships” where the general 
strategy is to be quiet.  
Nevertheless, security breaches are on the rise.  In the year 2005 alone 
“Privacy Rights Clearing House,” a privacy rights group, documented that between 
February 15, 2005 — when the ChoicePoint incident came to attention — to May 22, 
2006 over 81 million records have been compromised (A Chronology of Data 
Breaches Reported since the Choicepoint Incident 2006). The list of companies that 
have experienced a security incident includes firms like Citigroup, Bank of America, 
Ameritrade, DSW, Lexis Nexus, Polo Ralph Lauren, and even the United States Air 
Force.  The list of firms showed that both personal and financial information of 
customers have been compromised.  
One consequence of increased security breaches is that it has spurred the law 
makers to introduce a variety legislation similar to the existing California Law SB-
1386 (Security Breach Information Act 2002) to mandate security breaches reporting. 
This is in addition to the fact that over half the states have recently been enacting 
similar laws1.  Both the House and Senate (U.S. Congress) have introduced various 
bills that among others includes “Consumer Data Security and Notification Act” (HR. 
3140 - Bean), “Information Protection and Security Act” (S. 500 Nelson), “Personal 
                                                 





Data Privacy and Security Act” (S 1789 - Specter), “Comprehensive Identity Theft 
Prevention Act” (S. 768 - Schumer) and “Identity Theft Protection Act” (S 1408 - 
Smith). 
The aforementioned legislation, if approved, would further burden the 
organizations that are already facing various compliance issues under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB - 1999), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA - 1996), and most recently Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX - 2002).  Most 
specifically, under SOX section 404, companies need to not only establish, maintain, 
and report the ‘internal controls,’ but these internal control are to be audited annually, 
and any material deficiency are to be reported.  Even though SOX deals specifically 
with establishing internal controls only for financial reporting, the majority of 
organizations rely on computers for their financial reports.  Hence, internal controls, 
if not directly, then for sure indirectly, (see e.g., Nearon et al. 2005), are about 
implementing information security measures.  Gordon et al. (2005) also documents 
that in about eight out of 14 industry segments, SOX has an impact on security 
activities.  
The discussion above, underscores the following question of interest: Would 
voluntary reporting of security disclosures have an economic impact on firms’ market 
value?  That is, would the market value the discretionary disclosures of information 
security?  Simply stated, the objective of this dissertation is to assess the market value 
of firms’ voluntary disclosures of information security activities.  It is important to 
note that this research attempts to account for all voluntary disclosures of information 




and actual security breaches—see section 4.4 for details) as opposed to previous 
studies, such as Campbell et al. (2003) that focus specifically on the affects of an 
actual security breach on a firm’s market value. 
To investigate the question of market value of voluntary disclosures, I relied 
on the accounting literature of discretionary disclosures which operates on a 
maintained assumption that managers posses superior information (Healy and Palepu 
2001).  If the information is such that it would imply a firm value larger than those 
assessed by the market, the manager would provide credible disclosures so that the 
firm market value is revised upwards (Milgrom 1981; Grossman 1981; Lev and 
Penman 1990). That is, managers ‘signal’ their superior information; and one of the 
mechanism for conveying information is annual filings (Healy and Palepu 1995). 
Previous research in accounting has consistently documented the market 
consequences of voluntary disclosures that include increased stock liquidity, reduced 
cost of capital, reduced cost of debt, improved intermediations, and increased stock 
prices through non-financial disclosures (see e.g., Amir and Lev 1996; Botosan 1997; 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Sengupta 1998; Healy et al. 1999; Lang and Lundholm 
1996b, 2000). Thus, I hypothesize that discretionary disclosures of security-related 
activities would be positively related to stock price. 
Information security-related data is notoriously hard to obtain, in fact, Kotulic 
and Clark (2004) documents that information security data is the “most intrusive” 
type of organizational research, and recommends against using surveys. Thus, one 
contribution of this research is identifying a public data source of information security 




disclosed security activities in their annual filings for the five years between the years 
2000-04.  To better understand the ‘type’ of information being disclosed, a taxonomy 
of security disclosures was proposed that categorizes security disclosures as either 
“proactive security measures,” “potential vulnerability,” or “actual security breach.”  
The final sample consists of 1,637 firms-years that provided one of these types of 
security disclosure.  One advantage of conducting keyword searches over “all” the 
annual filers is that the non-disclosing firms can then be used as a potential natural 
control.  Thus, the final sample for analysis was 21,120 (1,637 disclosing and 19,483 
non-disclosing) firm-years. 
Empirical analysis of value-relevance of voluntary disclosures of information 
security activities to equity market value was conducted using established accounting 
methodology of “value-relevance” models2 (Barth 2000; Barth and Clinch 2005).  
Using price-levels cross-sectional pooled regressions (Kothari and Zimmerman 
1995), the results provided empirical support that security disclosures are 
significantly and positively related to firm value.  These findings were robust to year-
to-year and industry-wide analyses.  Additionally, industry-wide analyses provided 
evidence that, in general, the disclosure indicator variable is capturing the effect of 
security activities and not just “high disclosers,” thereby mitigating proxy 
(measurement) bias.  Additional robustness checks using returns model, matched-pair 
design, and self-selection control model, supports the main finding of the study.  
                                                 
2 Value relevance methodology is an empirical analysis associating a dependent variable (usually stock 
price) with various explanatory variables.  Other methodologies employed include ‘event-studies’ 




The contribution of the research is as follows: it adds to the voluntary 
disclosures argument by providing support for the signaling argument that manager 
would disclose information to revise investors’ beliefs in a manner consistent with 
increasing firm value.  The study also contributes to the extant literature of value-
relevance by providing support for intangible discretionary disclosures.  Furthermore, 
managerial implications of the study are that firms should disclose the firm’s current 
activities in the information security arena, as the market values it. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: literature review is 
provided in Chapter 2, while Chapter 3 develops the hypothesis.  In Chapter 4, 
methodology and sample selection is discussed, while Chapter 5 details the results 
and discussion.  Robustness analysis and sensitivity checks are discussed in 




Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
This dissertation proposal draws on two main streams of research: first, the 
computer science related research addressing information security issues from 
technical, behavioral, and economics viewpoint; and second, the body of literature in 
accounting that addresses the issue of disclosures. 
Even though information security is a relatively new field, computer science 
has a mature body of literature on computer security that deals mostly with technical 
issues.  The research on economics of information security, even though growing, is 
sparse.  Researchers are mostly exploring basic questions that pertain to technology 
i.e., how can the technology (security algorithms efficiency) be improved to increase 
the security levels, or how can intrusion detection systems be made effective using 
cost based algorithms (Lee et al. 2002).  In addition, another area of interest in the 
Information Technology (IT) field is exploring the fact that it might just not simply be 
the technology, but rather the “right” usage of existing resources by people that might 
be detrimental in protecting information assets.  Especially, for IT security, Schultz et 
al. (2001, p. 621) underscores that “users are … the weak link in information 
security” and “many (if not most) security-related controls rely on individuals to 
implement and deploy”.  Nevertheless, there is a shift, where the focus is now 
towards the “economics of information security”.  In other words, the main question 
of interest is the optimal level of security investment levels, information sharing, and 




Compared to the economics information security research in computer 
science, accounting has a mature stream of literature for disclosures, especially for 
voluntary disclosures.  The main focal point of disclosures stream is voluntary 
disclosure of financial information like earnings guidance or management forecasts, 
and the manager’s motivations for such disclosures.  This stream of literature contains 
both analytical models and empirical studies, and is discussed in detail below.   
2.1 Computer Security Literature on Information Security 
2.1.1 Technical and Behavioral Research 
The majority of the research on Information Security (IS) is done to analyze 
the security issues from a technology perspective, and is carried out by the 
researchers in computer science and engineering fields.  These streams of research 
focus on the technical design issues (e.g., encryption, public key infrastructure, access 
controls, and firewalls) with an expectation of reducing the frequency of security 
breaches (see for e.g., Sandhu et al. 1996; Denning and Branstad 1996; Simmons 
1994).  In addition, academicians specializing in management issues concentrate on 
the behavioral aspects of preventing IS breaches (e.g., Straub and Welke 1998; Straub 
1990).  Especially Straub (1990), using ‘general deterrence theory’ framework, 
provides empirical support for the fact the firms that use preventive information 
security software and institute security polices reduce computer abuse.   
2.1.2 Economics Research – Analytical  
In contrast, research using economic aspects of information security is rather 




using economic concepts.  The author suggests that barring technology constraints, 
the “information insecurity is due to perverse economic incentives.”  Anderson 
proposes that the issue should be re-evaluated using economic concepts like 
information asymmetry, network externalities, and liability dumping.  However, the 
paper is mostly a conceptual discussion without any analytical or empirical results.   
One notable exception is the recent paper by Gordon and Loeb (2002a), where 
the authors propose an economic model to determine the optimal investment in IS.  
The most interesting finding of the paper is that for a single constant threat, the 
optimal amount of security investment may or may not be an increasing function of 
the vulnerability.  In fact, for two classes of security breach functions, the optimal 
amount to spend to information security never exceeds 37% of the expected loss from 
a breach.  However, the paper does not address the varying “expert” levels of the 
hackers that might incur a loss.  It also assumes that the security breach function is 
known, i.e., the various parameters and their functional forms are known beforehand. 
In a game theoretic approach, Schecter and Michael (2003) develop a model 
where an organization can gauge its attractiveness to thieves and determine the level 
of security for packaged systems.  Under varying conditions of attack, the authors 
show that the firm would benefit substantially by increasing the probability of 
detection and/or the probability of repelling (failed) hacker attack, and by increasing 
the likelihood of (hacker) convictions.  However, the study is again based on the 
assumption that organizations can and/or have developed the estimates for these 





Gordon, Loeb and Lucyshyn (2003) is one of the first papers in the accounting 
literature that deals with the organization investments in information security in an 
information sharing environment.  Using an analytical model, the authors evaluate the 
welfare economic implications of sharing information.  The model supports the 
proven economic result that in the absence of information sharing, each firm sets its 
own information security expenditures at a level where its marginal benefits equal its 
marginal costs.  Gordon et. al. (2003) shows that when information is shared, each 
firm reduces the amount spent on information security activities, however, the level 
of information security is increased.  That is, the level of information security that 
would be optimal for a firm in the absence of information sharing, could be attained 
by the firm at reduced investment when computer security information is shared.  
Overall, sharing provides benefits to each firm/ and the total welfare also increases.  
However, the paper goes on to detail that if appropriate incentive mechanisms are 
absent, then each firm will attempt to free ride on the security investment of other 
firms resulting in underinvestment of information security.  As such the paper 
suggests that it is imperative to establish appropriate incentive mechanisms to not 
only increase firm-level profits, but to also enhance the social welfare realized from 
information sharing arrangements. 
2.1.3 Economics Research – Empirical 
Empirical research for information security currently is very limited mostly 
because of the fact that it is very hard, if not nearly impossible, to get public data.  
Mostly the data has to be collected using surveys.  However, even then the firms are 




their paper titled “Why There aren’t More Information Security Research Studies” 
their experience in trying to collect security-related information.  The authors propose 
a conceptual model for testing the overall success of information security risk 
management program at the firm level.  Drawing heavily on previous theoretical 
background on information systems success factors, the model identifies 
organizational characteristics, management characteristics, and executive level 
support as drivers of the overall security risk management program.  However, for 
empirical estimation, the paper relies on surveys.  To gather all the requisite 
information, 1474 packages (each including 4 questionnaires, ( Kotulic and Clark 
2004, p. 603)) were sent.  However, the response rate was only 1.6% (23 firms) and 
only 9 firms (0.61% response rate) completed all four of the questionnaires, making it 
impossible to conduct any parametric or non-parametric tests.  In a follow up, the 
authors determined that one of the top four reasons for a firm’s non-response was due 
to the “company policy for not disclosing computer security policy with outsiders” 
(Kotulic and Clark 2004, p. 604).  Overall, the paper’s recommendation is that 
information security research is “one of the most intrusive” type of organizational 
research. 
Campbell, Gordon, Loeb and Zhou (2003) conducted an event study, the first 
of its kind, to empirically test market reaction to announcements of security breaches.  
The study used keywords like “information security breach,” “computer system 
security,” “hacker,” “cyber attack,” and “computer break-in” to search five 
newspapers (Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Washington Post, New York Times, 




sample consisted of 43 events for 38 firms.  Using the event study methodology 
(short window), daily returns over a three-day period are estimated.  Overall, the 
paper does not find any significant market reaction for all the security breaches 
events.  However, when the events are partitioned between two groups of 
confidentiality and non-confidentiality, the results are statistically significant, with an 
economic implication of as much as 5 percent reduction in stock price. 
One of latest empirical study regarding information security was done using 
Japanese e-local government data by Tanaka et al. (2005).  The authors in this study 
attempt to provide empirical support for the Gordon and Loeb (2002a) information 
security investment finding i.e., investment in security is contingent on the 
vulnerabilities faced by a firm.  For a sample of 3,162 local municipalities that 
included cities, towns and villages involved in e-government initiatives, the authors 
gathered their information technology expenditures as well as information regarding 
security policies of the units.  One of the unique features of data was the fact that 
various local governments were in different stages of technology implementation, 
which allowed the authors to classify the vulnerability of various systems into three 
groups: high (highly interconnected – inter-governmental network), medium-high 
(regional network), and low (closed network).  The main result of the research 
provides partial support to the theoretical argument that information security 
investment is conditional on the vulnerabilities faced by an organization.  However, it 
must be noted that since actual information security expenditure was not available, 
the authors used the assumption that if a firm has an information security policy, then 




2.2 Accounting Literature on Disclosures 
Both theoretical and empirical studies on disclosures abound in accounting 
(see e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; and Verrecchia 2001, summary papers for a good 
discussion) where the focus is on the informational role of the disclosures of financial 
reporting for capital markets.  Although the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) provides guidelines and legislates the information that a public company must 
disclose i.e., mandatory reporting, the disclosure literature in accounting relates to 
discretionary (voluntary) disclosures.  For the purpose of this report, voluntary 
disclosures, discretionary disclosures and disclosures were used interchangeably to 
mean information that management releases itself.   
The underlying assumption in all the voluntary disclosure research is that 
managers possess superior information to all the outsiders, even if everyone are 
operating in an efficient market, about the expected future performance.  If the 
auditing and other regulations mandating reporting were perfect, there would not be 
any need for voluntary disclosures.  Thus, managers trade-off between making 
accounting choices and providing disclosures to “communicate their superior 
knowledge of a firm’s performance to investors, and to manage reported performance 
for contracting, political or corporate governance reasons” (Healy and Palepu 2001, p. 
420).  Under such a scenario, the motives of managers making voluntary disclosures 
and their credibility are questions of interest.  For the former, researchers have put 
forward six motives: 1) Capital market transaction hypothesis; 2) Corporate control 
content; 3) Stock compensation; 4) Litigation costs; 5) Management talent signaling; 




Under the credibility of voluntary disclosure, much of the empirical evidence 
focuses on accuracy and stock price effects of management forecasts.  Pownall and 
Waymire (1989) find that market reaction to unexpected management forecasts is 
similar to unexpected earnings, suggesting that management forecasts have similar 
credibility as audited financial information.  Additionally, other information like 
market population size and market penetration (of wireless industry) has also been 
shown to be more significant than financial information (Amir and Lev 1996). 
The theoretical papers, under the maintained hypothesis of proprietary cost, 
are most concerned with what types of disclosures might occur (Healy and Palepu 
2001). On the other hand, the empirical studies are more focused on identifying the 
determinants of increased disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993, 1996b); 
investigating why firms would like to disclose ‘bad news” (Skinner 1997, 1994); and 
evaluating the effect of increased disclosures on the cost of capital, both equity and 
debt (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Sengupta 1998). 
2.2.1 Analytical Research 
Most of the theoretical studies of voluntary disclosure, assuming credible 
disclosures and zero disclosure costs, suggest full disclosure of information will occur 
due to investors’ belief that non-disclosing firms have the worst possible information 
(Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981).  However, in the presence of fixed positive 
disclosure costs, only firms whose information implies economic benefits above these 
costs will disclose (Verrecchia 1983).  In addition, a firm’s decision to disclose 
information to investors is influenced by the fact that such disclosures would also 




well (Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Verrecchia 1983; Gigler 1994; Darrough 1993; 
Wagenhofer 1990).  Additionally, another assumption underlying all these studies is 
that there is no conflict of interest among the managers and shareholders, and that the 
motivations of disclosing purely arise out of economic forces due to the presence of 
competitors.  These studies show that it is not in the firm’s interest to disclose 
information, or alternatively that the disclosures are constrained.  However, Gigler 
(1994) using “cheap talk” model and Sujis (2005) using the Wagenhofer model 
(1990), which incorporates three players (firm, competitor and financial markets), 
demonstrates that under certain conditions, partial equilibrium would exist where it is 
in the firm’s interest to disclose information even if it is not good.  That is, the 
equilibrium choice of not disclosing bad information is contingent on the incentives 
faced by the firm in terms of competition.  Interestingly, in a recent study by Einhorn 
(2005), the author classifies the voluntary disclosure strategies of a firm in relation to 
its mandatory disclosure environment.  The main finding of the paper is that the 
probability of voluntary disclosure is independent of the content of their mandatory 
disclosure, positively related to the scope of disclosing requirements, and negatively 
related to the level of discretion in mandatory disclosure.  Overall, research suggests 
that in addition to firm-related incentives, the mandatory reporting environment also 
plays a crucial role in its voluntary disclosures. 
2.2.2 Empirical Research 
Most of the empirical research in the voluntary disclosure line of literature is 
focused around either the capital market transaction, or the litigation cost hypothesis.  




disclosures is the Lang and Lundholm paper titled “Cross-Sectional Determinants of 
Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures” (1993).  Lang and Lundholm take the 
disclosure ratings of the analysts as published in the Reports of the Financial Analyst 
Federation Corporate Information Committee (FAF Reports).  For a sample of 2,272 
firms, the authors investigate three measures of disclosures ratings i.e., for annual 
reports, ‘other publications,’ and investor relations.  Using market-adjusted stock 
returns and its standard deviation; one time period lead-lag of deviation from analyst 
forecasts; and market value of equity, their study provides evidence that disclosures 
are increasing in firm size, and in firm performance as measures by earnings and 
return variables; decreasing in the correlation between earnings and returns and 
higher for firms issuing securities. 
To empirically test the effect of signaling hypothesis, Lev and Penman (1990) 
use managerial earnings forecast to test if these forecasts help managers to screen 
themselves out from other firms.  The papers test two hypotheses: first, that firms that 
disclose positive information will have an upward revision in their price, and 
consequently the second issue of interest is that for the non-disclosing firms, the 
market should penalize them by revising the stock price downwards.  The study used 
a sample of 3,420 corporate forecasts of annual earnings for 1968-75 by a page-by-
page reading of the Wall Street Journal.  This sample also included qualitative versus 
quantitative forecasts.  Using a matched-pair firm design, the paper tested the 
hypotheses for return residuals, and annual cumulative returns across the forecasting 
and non-forecasting firms.  Overall, even though the paper does provide support that 




firms are punished is not supported.  Additionally, the paper does find that on average 
the firms does good news more often there are many instances of decreased earnings 
forecasts as well, that do tend to reduce the stock price.  However, the surprising 
finding is that the market does not punish non-disclosing firms, but rather the effect 
on the non-disclosing firms is generally in the same direction as the disclosing firm. 
Skinner (1994) further investigates the reasons of why firms would like to 
disclose bad news voluntarily, specifically if such a disclosure reduced the firm’s 
value.  He observes that even though good news information tends to be more 
specific, bad news tends to be more qualitative; however, the unconditional stock 
price reaction to bad news is much larger than the response to good news.  The paper 
uses a ten-year period of 1981-90, and identifies 93 firms on the NASDAQ that 
provided voluntary disclosures before it is required by law.  Since NASDAQ firms 
during this time-period mainly consisted of smaller and younger firms, the analyst 
following was relatively less.  Also, these firms were likely to experience large 
shocks of earnings that might lead to securities lawsuits, and last but not least, these 
voluntary disclosures are valuable means of communication.  The overall, finding of 
the paper is that managers “face an asymmetric loss function…[i.e.,] managers 
behave as if they bear large costs when investors are surprised by large negative 
earnings surprises” (Skinner 1994, p. 39).  Thus, managers might disclose since they 
may get sued or because they incur reputational costs. 
Botosan (1997) in an another seminal research studied the effect of improved 
disclosures on the cost of equity capital providing empirical support for the 




capital.  Using a sample of 122 manufacturing firms, a disclosures measure was 
developed based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided in the 1990 annual 
reports.  The association between level of disclosures and the cost of equity capital 
was examined by regressing firm-specific estimates of cost of equity capital on the 
self-constructed measure of disclosure level, while controlling for firm-specific 
variables like firm beta and size.  The main findings of the study was that for firms 
that have a low analyst following (generally small), greater disclosure was associated 
with a lower cost of equity capital.  However, for firms with a high analyst following, 
there was no evidence of an association between level of disclosure and cost of equity 
capital.  Botosan concluded that the lack of evidence in the high analyst following 
firms could be attributed to the fact that the self-created disclosure measure was 
limited to the annual report, and might not be a powerful proxy for overall disclosure 
level, especially where analysts have a significant role in disseminating information. 
Further expanding the literature on voluntary disclosures, Healy et al. (1999) 
investigates the effects on expanded disclosures on changes in capital market factors 
associated with increases in analyst disclosure.  By using a “time-series approach,” 
the paper provides support that firms with ‘sustained improvements’ in disclosures, 
experience an improved stock performance and capital market intermediation i.e., 
increased institutional interest.  They use a sample of firms that made sustained and 
materially significant improvements in their disclosures over the 1978-91 timeframe.  
Using the same database as Lang and Lundholm (1993) , which covered about 1,044 
firms in 38 industries, the authors identified 97 firms for the years 1978-91 that met 




with increased disclosures are accompanied with firms’ stock returns, institutional 
ownership, analyst following and stock liquidity. 
Sengupta (1998) extends the voluntary disclosure literature by investigating 
the relationship of disclosures and firms cost of debt.  His model uses disclosure as an 
explanatory variable along with control variables to examine the association.  The 
sample size of the study is around 100 individual firms over the 1987-91 timeframe.  
The small sample size is due to the fact that the main research questions was to 
explain the cross-sectional variation in the cost of debt, and using firm-year (i.e., 
following multiple firms across years) observations might bias the t-values due to 
autocorrelation.  Using two proxies for cost of debt, yield to maturity and effective 
interest cost to the issuer, Sengupta documents a significant negative relationship 
between extended disclosures and cost of debt after controlling debt, and firm 
characteristics.  These findings provide support for the argument that lenders and 
underwriters account for a firm’s disclosure quality in the risk estimates.  
Additionally, the paper also documents that there is a greater reliance on disclosures 
when the uncertainty (stock volatility) surrounding a firm is higher.  Overall, the 
increased disclosures not only affect the cost of equity capital but debt as well.   
Finally, Bhojraj et al. (2004) in a recent paper, attempts to empirically test the 
theoretical argument that firms, for strategic reason (product market), might choose 
not to disclose information.  The paper identified 81 electric utilities that were going 
through deregulation during 1996-97 and were facing conflicting demands for their 
disclosures requirements since they had to cater to at least three diverse audiences: 




authors constructed an overall disclosure measure on two broad issues: plans to deal 
with new risks (keep the current customer base intact); and plans to exploit new 
emerging opportunities in the industry (increase competition).  They used annual 
reports and 10-K filings3 to identify “qualitative” disclosures that were accordingly 
dummy coded as 1 if the disclosure was firm-specific regarding strategy to expand or 
steps to preserve the existing customer base, and 0 otherwise.  A “total disclosure” 
measure was constructed across the two years 1996-97, which was also disaggregated 
into two sub-categories.  The first sub-group specifically dealt with disclosures of 
plans to protect revenues while the second related to steps for exploiting new 
opportunities.  In the research design, appropriate controls were added to account for 
real economic difference among the firms as well, and firm-specific variables that 
might influence the disclosing choices of the firms.  Overall, the paper provides 
evidence that types of voluntary disclosures are conditional on the target audience 
i.e., according to the firm’s incentives.  Firms that were waiting for regulators to 
establish cost-recovery methods were inclined to provide less disclosure, consistent 
with the incentive to appear vulnerable.  On the other hand, voluntary disclosures of 
strategic nature that exploited the new available opportunities to the firms were 
sharply increased after the regulatory concerned abated.  However, these disclosures 
were “dampened” when there was competition, therefore providing support for the 
theoretical notion to ‘hold information’ in product market competition.  Finally, 
disclosures regarding plans to protect revenue base are motivated for reducing 
uncertainty about survival under deregulation, consistent with capital-market reasons. 
                                                 
3 10-K is the official filing that a firm has to provide to Securities and Exchange Commission as 




Chapter 3  
Hypothesis 
3.1 Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure  
Accounting literature has been interested in voluntary disclosures of 
information from managers, and considerable work has been done in identifying 
various conditions under which manager might or might not be willing to disclose 
(see Verrecchia 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Dye 2001 for summaries of empirical 
and theoretical literature on corporate voluntary disclosures).  Accordingly, my 
analysis is based on the theoretical and empirical analyses of corporate disclosures 
that assume management can have value-relevant private information about a firm’s 
prospect.  This information is not available to market participants (i.e., the 
information is private), thus the information is not reflected in the firm’s stock prices.  
Therefore, this private information provides an opportunity for management to 
voluntarily disclose information to reduce information asymmetry between the 
investors and management, thus potentially influencing the stock price. 
3.1.1 Signaling or Screening Incentive 
Building on the Akerlof (1970) ‘market for lemons model,’ “signaling” or 
“screening” rationales are proposed as strong motivation for disclosures (Milgrom 
1981; Grossman 1981; Verrecchia 1983).  Under such a scenario, managers with 
private information that implies larger firm values than what is assessed by the 
market, will credibly disclose that information such that the prices are revised 




below market estimates, will withhold that information.  However, the “silent” firms 
are identified by investors as having less than average values, and will further revise 
the stock prices downwards i.e., no news is bad news.  This downward revision of the 
non-disclosing firms will in turn compel the firms within the group with good news to 
disclose (relative to the recently decreased valuations) in order to ‘screen’ themselves 
out of the group (of the non-disclosing firms).  Thus, one way to look at voluntary 
disclosure is that firms can use it as a signaling or screening device to distance itself 
from other companies.   
3.1.2 Capital Market Incentives 
Beyond the signaling advantage, the accounting literature also underscores 
capital-market benefits as one of the reasons for firms to expand disclosures.  
Verrecchia (1983; 1990) shows that even when the disclosure is costly – under 
product market consequences – managers may still choose to enhance their reporting 
to correct undervaluation.  However, it is instructive to note that in these studies there 
is no agency conflict assumption i.e., the interest of the managers and investors are 
aligned.  Consequently, investors can be confident that any voluntary disclosures are 
‘truthful,’ and therefore credible signals.  The negative relation between the cost of 
capital and disclosure (Botosan 1997), and debt and expanded disclosures (Sengupta 
1998) are clear indications of managers committing to a policy of prompt disclosure 
of news.  Furthermore, expanded disclosures can also “improve intermediation for a 
firm’s stock” (Healy et al. 1999, p. 497) by reducing information asymmetries 




firm’s stock prices, and makes it more attractive, at least for the institutional 
investors.  
3.2 Value-Based Management 
According to Ittner and Larcker (2001), accounting practices and research is at 
the stage where controls and procedures are being designed and implemented to move 
management’s focus away from a strict concentration on planning and control. 
Currently, the emphasis is towards: waste-reduction; increased oversight to 
encompass a more strategic emphasis on the creation of firm-value through 
identification, measurement, and management of the drivers of customer value; and 
organization innovation that ultimately increase the shareholder return.  As Ittner and 
Larcker points out, the hallmark of this era is the introduction of a diverse set of 
‘new’ managerial accounting techniques that are concentrating on value creation.  
This comprehensive set of measures is what is termed as a value-based management 
framework or procedures that ensure management is operating in a manner to 
maximize stakeholder value.  Thus, proper utilization and protection of the 
organization’s assets will not only assist the firm attain its strategic goal 
“differentiator” or “cost leader,” but will also generate value for its stakeholders.  
Under the value creation paradigm (Ittner and Larcker 2001), firms are 
interested in operational and strategic expenditures that in one way or another create 
‘firm value.’  Therefore, the main issue of interest is to investigate the market impacts 
of information security activities on a firm.  Assuming that the market value 
maximization hypothesis holds, and that managers will invest only in those forms of 




to expect that Information Technology security expenditures will positively impact 
the market value of a firm.  However, as discussed previously, information security 
does not contribute directly to the top line growth.  On the contrary, information 
security-implementing departments are primarily cost-centers.  Nevertheless, if a firm 
is allocating its resources efficiently, it will benefit due to secondary effects of these 
investments.  For example, the benefits of these expenditures would be saving direct 
losses (labor and resources cost of recreating the information asset breached), and 
indirect losses like reputation (increased customer confidence would result in repeat 
purchase), as well as litigation (compliance).  Campbell et. al. (2003) already 
provides evidence that there is a substantial negative impact of security breaches, 
therefore, firms that are actively engaged in information security activities should 
have a positive market value.  Nevertheless, none of the firms are reporting the actual 
expenditures in their information security activities.  Hence, the only way to 
communicate is to disclose the information security activities or steps, if not the 
actual investment amounts, to revise the stock prices. 
3.3 Mandatory Disclosure Environment 
Finally, to better understand the value of the voluntary disclosure and its 
effect on the stock price, I need to account for its interaction with the mandatory 
disclosure environment of the firm as well (Einhorn 2005).  Specifically, if the 
correlation between the mandatory and the voluntary disclosure is negative, the direct 
and indirect effect of voluntary disclosure will be such that the coefficient on the 
voluntary disclosure signal will be positive.  For example, if expenditures on 




disclosure of security activities) that is negatively related to earnings (mandatory 
disclosure), should result in an upward revision of the priors about earnings.  Such an 
upward revision of priors will cause the firms price to be adjusted upward as well. 
Subsequently, under the maintained assumption, firms will engage in 
activities that tend to maximize their values (i.e., managers will only accept projects – 
even information security related – that have a positive net present value).  Therefore, 
managers who possess private information (information security activities and 
investments are unobservable), which can result in correcting the otherwise 
undervalued stock, will disclose that information, if not for capital-market reason, 
then at least to ‘signal’ that their firms’ are different from the rest.  More specifically, 
if the voluntary disclosure is negatively correlated with the mandatory disclosures, it 
will cause the company’s stock price to increase, and will have a positive coefficient 
(Einhorn 2005).  Hence, my general hypothesis, stated in null form is: 








Chapter 4  
Methodology and Data 
4.1 Methodology  
For this research, I draw on the value-relevance methodology which is a well 
established technique in accounting.  Value-relevance methodology has been used for 
not only valuing fair-value accounting for financial, intangible and intangible assets, 
but also for the studies that evaluate the effects of recognition4 versus disclosures of 
various types of information and firm value (Barth 2000; Aboody et al. 2002; Aboody 
and Lev 1998; Adams and Hossain 1998; Amir 1996; Amir and Lev 1996; Barth 
1994; Barth et al. 1992; Barth et al. 1998).  Other financial and non-financial 
information that have been found to be value-relevant by prior research include non-
financial information in the wireless communications industry (Amir and Lev 1996), 
value of customer satisfaction for firm value (Ittner and Larcker 1998), the disclosure 
of net periodic pension cost components as under SFAS 87 (Barth et al. 1992), the 
capitalization of Research and Development (R&D )expenditures (Lev and 
Sougiannis 1996), the capitalization of software development costs as under SFAS 86 
(Aboody and Lev 1998), and fair value disclosures (Barth 1994; Barth and Clinch 
1996). 
                                                 
4 Recognition relates to accounting information that is formally a part of financial reports i.e., appear in 
a balance sheet, income or cash flow statement, while disclosure refers to information that is usually 
presented, but not accounted for e.g., under SFAS No. 123 expense guideline stock-based employee 




Barth (2000) provides an excellent summary of the value-relevance literature 
in her paper titled “Valuation-based Accounting Research: Implications for Financial 
Reporting and opportunities for future research” in which she identifies three main 
models that have been used extensively in the value-relevance research as earnings 
(dividend) model, balance sheet model, and firm value model.  Each of the three 
models is discussed in detail below.   
Price dividend (earnings) model is based on the relationship that current value 
Pt (price at time t) of the firm is expected value of the future value of the dividends, 

















1  (1) 
Where E is the expectation operator and ‘r’ is the discount rate for the 
appropriate time-period ‘t’.  For empirical studies, a link is posited between the 
accounting numbers and expected future dividends, which usually is in the form of 
some components of net income that are considered to be permanent rather than 
earnings that are persistent (Barth 2000).  The balance sheet model expresses market 
value of equity (MVE) as a function of the market values of the firm’s assets (MVA) 
and market value of its liabilities (MVL) (Barth 1991). These values are considered to 
be the present value future expected dividends associated with the firm’s obligations.  
Hence, the model to be estimated becomes: 
 ttt MVLMVAMVE +=  (2) 
                                                 




For evaluation purposes, the reported accounting assets and liabilities numbers 
are posit to be the proxy for all of the firm’s assets and liabilities.  However, it should 
be noted that accounting numbers do not reflect the values of intangibles like R&D, 
goodwill or other non-financial measures that might affect the firm’s market value 
(Barth and Landsman 1995).  Hence, a careful consideration of the research issue and 
the variables is required, since the inferences from the model might be confounded 
due to missing variables. 
Recently, the focus in the value-relevance research has slowly shifted to using 
an empirical specification that has come to be known as Ohlson’s model.  Even 
though most of the credit for the model development is attributed to Ohlson (1995), 
references to theoretical arguments for using accounting numbers (book value of 
equity – BVE and net income – NI) dates back to Edwards and Bell (1961), and 
Peasnell (1982), who mathematically shows the formal link between using the current 
BV and NI to estimate firm value.  Nevertheless, it was the Ohlson (1995) paper that 
revived the interest in firm value and accounting numbers, thus, for the purpose of 
this paper, the valuation specification will henceforth be referred to as Ohlson’s 
model.   
The most important feature of the model that has made it so popular, is the 
fact that it provides a direct link between accounting amounts and the firm value, and 
thus, has become the most pervasive valuation model in accounting research.  The 
main underlying assumption for the model is the clean surplus accounting i.e., change 
in book value of equity = earnings less dividend plus or minus capital transactions 





















1  (3) 
Where Vt is the resulting firm value which should equal stock price Pt, and xa 
is abnormal earnings or net income in excess of the discount rate time beginning of 
period book value of equity given by Nit – r*BVEt-1 (Barth 2000). Ohlson (1995), 
provides more structure to the model (by adding information dynamics assumptions), 
and thus provides an empirically testable valuation function as: 
 ( ) ( ) ttttt dNIkBVEkV ναϕ 21 +−++=  (4) 
In the above equation, “ν” is other information and “ϕ” is a function of the 
discount rate while “k” becomes a function of the discount rate and persistence of 
abnormal earnings.  Specifically, the inclusion of “k” in the above model assists in 
thinking about the relative importance of BVE or NI in valuation.  As Barth (2000) 
notes, since these functions can not only vary temporally but also for each firm, one 
can use the model to evaluate the relative importance of either BVE or NI for relative 
valuation implications.  For example, “k” can depend on the measurement attributes 
of BVE and NI i.e., if all assets (intangible as well as tangible) were recognized at fair 
value, NI is simply measured as gains and losses, and ν = 0, then k = 0 because the 
persistence of abnormal earnings equals zero.  On the contrary, if BVE is measured at 
historical cost and NI captures the excess of value-in-use over the start values for a 




4.1.1 Valuation-Model Limitations 
As with all functional forms, the Ohlson valuation model has its limitation.  In 
a comprehensive review of the accounting value-relevance literature, Holthausen and 
Watts (2001) concludes that in general most, of the models and more specifically at 
least the earnings and balance sheet models are flawed.  The major concern put forth 
by them is that since the prime objective of the value-relevance studies is to provide 
guidance for accounting standard setting, the contribution of value-relevance research 
is ‘modest’ since “literature does not seek to develop a descriptive theory of 
accounting and standard settings (Holthausen and Watts 2001, p. 63).  Furthermore, 
for all valuation models the underlying assumptions are seldom true i.e., the 
maintained assumption of perfect and complete markets for balance sheet models, 
competitive capital-markets conjecture for earnings specifications and costless 
information for Ohlson’s models, are seldom if at all correct.  Hence, the models do 
not provide any “accounting theory.” 
For the price dividend (earnings) model, where earnings or its components are 
regressed against stock prices, Holthausen and Watts points out that earnings are not 
‘cash flows,’ and do not represent cash flows in the period in which they occur.  
Accordingly, the discount rate being estimated is not the firm’s ‘true’ cost of equity 
(see equation 1), and hence cannot make capitalized earnings equal to the market 
value of firms (since the discount rate is not identified).  Accordingly, the coefficient 
of earnings in the earnings models cannot be predicted (2001, p. 57).  
Notwithstanding, the conservatism (in accounting), the model specification requires 




clear how a generalization can be made across all firms where extreme earnings 
(especially negative values) are not only transient, perhaps due to abandonment 
option (Hayn 1995), but also exhibit non-linear trend (Freeman and Tse 1992).  
Specifically, in the earnings model, these non-linear trends are not reflected.  
Additionally, there might be correlated omitted variables of the earnings components 
like depreciation which could be positively correlated cross-sectionally with net 
assets, and as such might proxy for omitted abandonment and/or growth options. 
For the balance sheet model, Holthausen and Watts points out that the 
functional form (see equation 2) holds only if all the relevant markets exist i.e., there 
is a market for a company’s assets, liabilities, and for its stock (2001, p. 53).  Also, all 
the markets are competitive so that there are no abnormal returns (rents) to the firm.  
However, if the firm has some competitive advantage, then the company can earn 
‘excess’ returns, provided that the technology can be sold separately.  Nevertheless, if 
the technology is not separable e.g., process advantage in manufacturing, and not 
saleable, then the value of the net asset is not associated with the value of the firm, 
except to the extent the technology affects future operating cash-flow.  Also in this 
case, the equity value is an increasing convex function of the net assets (Wysocki 
1998).  Hence, the linear specification in equation 2 is not correct.  Moreover, in most 
of the studies, not all the assets or liabilities are included, which creates a correlated 
omitted variable bias resulting in inconsistent coefficient estimates.  This situation is 
further exacerbated when ‘notional’ proxies are included in the valuation for items 




balance sheet’ items are off value, or if it is because of the expected rents that might 
accrue (Holthausen and Watts 2001, p. 56). 
The Ohlson’s (1995) model, although by far the better of the other two, has its 
own limitations.  Under residual income valuation mode and a clean surplus 
assumption, primarily the most significant issue with the model is that the results 
from the analysis have no empirical implications for the choice of different 
accounting procedures.  Also, any test of the Ohlson model is a joint test of the 
residual income valuation model and the assumed information dynamics, which 
might differ significantly especially in a case of cross-country analysis.  Last but not 
least, even though the model accounts for book value, it does not take into 
consideration options, which might conflict with the linearity assumption of the 
model (Holthausen and Watts 2001, p. 60).   
Additionally, two other concerns that should be addressed in valuation 
research have to deal with using a levels versus returns specification (Barth 2000), 
and firm and industry level effects especially in a cross-sectional pooled design 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001; Barth et al. 2001; Barth and Kallapur 1996; Wild 1992).  
Easton  (1999) documents that results from levels valuation models could be 
misleading since the statistical association between price and explanatory variables 
maybe nothing more than spurious ‘scale’ effects.  This result occurs because, in 
general, large firms will have a large total market value, large book value and 
accordingly large net income.  Furthermore, since other attributes of interest of the 
large firms might also be large, the price levels regressions will be capturing nothing 




outstanding shares; however, this might not correct the scale effect, because 
management has discretion over the number of shares outstanding.  Thus, the 
management may choose to split the stock, effectively changing the per-share-price, 
“without effectively changing the economic characteristics of the firm” (Easton 1999, 
p. 404).  Thus, regression results might be capturing the scale effect of a firm for its 
attributes, while scale might differ across firms.  Returns regression i.e., change in 
prices with associated change in explanatory variables is an effective remedy since 
ceteris paribus, return is price difference for each individual firm, and is not affected 
by managers’ choices of number of shares outstanding.  Furthermore, time-
differencing a price model would account for any misspecification (e.g., 
intertemporal constant correlated omitted variable – industry or firm specific effect), 
if present, and will result in a well-specified model. 
4.1.2 Value Relevance Model - Current Status 
In a response to Holthausen and Watts (2001) critique, Barth et al. (2001) 
provides a comprehensive reply which concludes that even though the empirical 
specifications might not be optimal, the valuation models with all their limitation still 
persist.  First and foremost, addressing the issue that current value-relevance research 
is not providing guidance for accounting standard setters, Barth et al. (2001) argues 
that value-relevance research helps investors (who are the primary users of 
accounting information) in better estimating the value of the firm.  Also, the main 
focus of the research is to provide evidence for standard setters to assist in their 
deliberations rather than prescribe or direct actions.  Also, a key element that needs to 




value, but rather to learn about the “valuation characteristics of a particular 
accounting amounts” (Barth et al. 2001, p. 90). 
Currently, among all of the three valuation specifications, Ohlson’s (1995) 
model and its subsequent refinements is the most commonly used model.  This model 
is based on the simplifying assumptions and represents a parsimonious view of the 
complex world.  Even though the model assumes perfect capital markets, it allows for 
imperfect product markets for at least a finite number of periods.  With additional 
assumptions of information dynamics the model allows the firm value to be expressed 
as linear function of equity book value, net income and other information (Barth et al. 
2001, p. 91).  Also, since there is no well-specified model of equity valuation under 
imperfect and incomplete capital market, the best that value relevance studies can do 
is to use something like Ohlson’s model, but make suitable modifications to the 
estimating equation to represent the particular setting being studied. 
Two main concerns raised by Holthausen and Watts (2001) relate to omitted 
economic rents and accounting for non-linearities between the specification.  Barth et 
al. suggest that even though economic rents can be viewed in the Ohlson’s framework 
as being reflected in the persistence of abnormal earnings, these rents can also be 
modeled specifically i.e., including proxies that value present value of future cash-
flows attributable to such recognized assets, which might even include intangible like 
customer lists, brand names, and research and development.  As for non-linearity, 
even though the model is a linear function of equity book value and abnormal 
earnings, the persistence of these abnormal earnings is accounted in the model 




not associated with constant marginal differences in equity value” (Barth et al. 2001, 
p. 92).  Simply stated, the model explicitly allows the valuation coefficients to vary 
not only cross-sectionally but also across components of BVE and NI, and thus 
provides a means for effectively controlling nonlinearities (see e.g. Barth et al. 1992; 
Barth et al. 1998; Aboody et al. 2004b). 
As for the concern regarding which type of analysis is to be conducted i.e., 
levels versus returns, the final selection depends jointly on the hypothesis of interest 
and on econometric concerns (Landsman and Magliolo 1988).  The main difference 
between the two types of analysis is that in former, the interest is in determining what 
is reflected in the firm value, while in the latter specification, concern is in addressing 
the question, “what is reflected in changes in value over a specific period of time” 
(Barth et al. 2001, p. 95 emphasis added).  Thus, it is imperative that an appropriate 
specification is selected based on the question under consideration.  That is, the 
choice of model is contingent upon the fact that it is a question of timeliness or of the 
association of value- relevance of accounting information. 
Econometric concerns in price level consist of coefficient bias induced by 
correlated omitted variables, measurement error, cross-sectional difference in 
valuation parameters, and possibly incorrectly calculated standard errors of 
coefficients due to heteroscedasticity (inefficiency).  Nevertheless, these issues have 
been discussed in great detail in literature which provides remedies to correct for 
these misspecifications (see e.g. Bernard 1987; Christie 1987; Kothari and 
Zimmerman 1995; Barth and Kallapur 1996; Barth and Clinch 2005; Landsman and 




Barth and Kallapur (1996), and Barth and Clinch (2005) ran simulation 
studies to empirically test the effects of scale and heteroscedasticity concerns and to 
see which deflator (if used at all) would provide the most consistent and unbiased 
estimates.  Both scale and heteroscedasticity form a main contention in the debate of 
price-levels versus returns models selection (e.g. see Easton 1999).   
Barth and Kallapur (1996) assumed that scale is an omitted regression 
variable. Deflation or including scale as an independent regression variable, are two 
possible remedies to compensate for scaling.  It is also interesting to note, that in 
value relevance literature, a number of potential accounting measures have been 
suggested that might proxy for scale and among other includes total assets, sales, 
number of shares outstanding.  Their finding suggests that including the scale-related 
variable in the model is more helpful in mitigating coefficient bias than deflating (for 
any of the possible scale factors).  This recommendation holds even when the proxy 
scale variable is 95 percent correlated with the true scale factor.  Thus, the study 
concludes that using an independent scale variable as an independent variable is 
superior to deflating.  However, it is worthwhile to note here that the main model of 
concern in this study was the balance sheet valuation model whose limitations have 
been discussed before.   
Barth and Clinch (2005) in a recent study again revisit the scale effects 
implications in the value relevance research.  However, this time the focused model is 
the Ohlson’s valuation specification.  The authors note that their reason for selecting 
Ohlson’s model is not because it represents a complete description of the firm value, 




accounting amounts.  Distinct from the previous studies, the paper starts out by 
formally characterizing as to what is a scale effect, since scale is not a well-defined 
concept in accounting and often the recommendations provided to mitigate it is 
conflicting (e.g. see Bernard 1987; Christie 1987; Landsman and Magliolo 1988; 
Easton 1998).  Thus, one contribution of the study is that it provides a clear 
distinction between the type of scale effects and their related affects on the model.  
The four varying scale effects are classified as: additive and multiplicative correlated 
omitted variable, scale varying valuation parameters, and scale-related 
heteroscedasticity.  Using simulated data to reflect the four effects (based on actual 
accounting numbers), the study attempts to empirically validate the inferences on the 
coefficient using an un-deflated specification, deflation using shares outstanding or 
book value of equity and a returns model.  Barth and Clinch concludes that share-
deflated specifications, overall, performs the best for data that might have scale 
effects, regardless of the ‘type’ of scale issue.  They also point out that “in principle 
the number of shares outstanding is arbitrary, so these finding might be surprising.  
However, market forces motivate firms to issue and repurchase shares to maintain 
their share prices within an acceptable trading range.  Our findings suggest that this 
activity results in number of shares outstanding being an effective general proxy for 
scale” (Barth and Clinch 2005, p. 26).  Notwithstanding, it is also worth nothing that 
the remedies suggested are specific to the model under investigation (Barth and 
Clinch 2005, see footnote 2).   
Furthermore, per the theoretical discussion of the Ohlson’s model, it might be 




potential.  In a similar vein, Aboody et al. (2004b, p. 255) suggests using an 
additional variable in the model that proxies for future earning potential, and 
recommends using mean year-end analyst’s earning’s growth forecast.  Their 
intuition behind using a future growth proxy is that the variable will capture or 
provide information regarding the future abnormal returns.  Accordingly, I used a 
measure Q (= Market Value/Book Value).  Technically, the measure Q is a 
representation of a firm’s monopoly power.  However, in the accounting literature, Q 
is also used to reflect the future growth potential.  The rationale for this application is 
that if price is a reflection of future earnings, that its ratio with the existing book 
value of the firm is a ratio of future earning potential for the organization.  Thus, Q is 
a proxy for the future abnormal earnings potential of a firm. 
4.2 Model 
Based on the discussion in the methodology section, I used Ohlson’s valuation 
model.  Specifically, the main question of interest is the value relevance of voluntary 
disclosures of security, and not the timeliness of the disclosure.  Therefore, I used 
price-level model in a cross-sectional pooled regression design.  Additionally, 
because price leads accounting recognition in incorporating new information, price 
levels design provides more economically sensible results (Kothari and Zimmerman 

















Pit  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit  = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items) for firm ‘i’ for 
year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit  = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm 
‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = MV divided by BV of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Dis = Proxy variable for “types” of disclosure being analyzed.  I use three 
regression specifications as follows: 
1) Base model without any disclosure variables, 
2) Generic security disclosure, where Dis = 1 if proactive security 
measure or potential security vulnerability or actual security 
breaches =1, 0 otherwise, 
3) For the second regression, I add the following six dummy variables 
in place of Dis to proxy for the following groups: 
i. Proactive security disclosures, where P = 1 if proactive 
security measure =1, 0 otherwise, 
ii. Potential security vulnerabilities (V), where V= 1 if potential 
security vulnerability =1, 0 otherwise, 
iii. Actual security breaches disclosures, where A = 1 if actual 




iv. Joint disclosures of proactive security measures and potential 
vulnerabilities, where PV = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
v. Joint disclosures of potential vulnerabilities and actual 
security breach, where VA = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
vi. Joint disclosures of proactive security measures and actual 
breaches, where PA = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
vii. Joint disclosure of proactive security measures, potential 
vulnerabilities and actual security breaches, where PVA = 1 
if joint disclosure, 0 otherwise 
Year = 1 if current year, 0 otherwise 
Industry =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Price, earnings and book value of equity are calculated for each firm ‘i’ for 
each time period ‘t.’ All the financial data is gathered from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged annual database of 2004, and are fiscal year-end values with the exception of 
stock price.  Book value of the firm is the stockholder’s equity (Compustat # 216), 
while earnings are basic earning per shares excluding extra items (Compustat # 58) 
and shares outstanding are proxied by common shares outstanding (Compustat # 25).  
Q is estimated as the ratio of market value [(Price per share * shares outstanding) / 




annual filings with the SEC, I use the three-month lead price.  This is important in my 
specification, since the variable of interest, voluntary disclosures of information 
security, are provided in the annual filings; and for its value to be reflected in market 
value of equity, I need to select a time by which the information is available to the 
market i.e., annual filing is publicly available to the investors.  Therefore, Pit is the 
price-per-share of the firm three months after the fiscal year-end.  Since my data 
includes the year 2004, I use COMPUSTAT industrial quarterly database (Q1) 2005 
to get Pt+Q1 prices for all firms6.  Furthermore, to ensure tractability, only the firms 
with fiscal year-end of December are included.  This helps in generating a natural 
control sample of the firms that did not disclose.  By restricting my sample to 
December fiscal-year end, I easily match the observations over all the firms in the 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP database. 
This model is a variant of the Ohlson’s valuation specification where price, 
earnings and book value of equity are scaled by shares outstanding at time ‘t’.  As 
discussed before, I use the outstanding shares to minimize the scale affect since this 
specification performs the best, regardless of the type of scale effects (Barth and 
Clinch 2005).  However, it is noteworthy that my variables of interests are neither the 
BVPS, EPS nor Q, so in my case they act more as “controls” or known explanatory 
variables for the stock prices i.e., I am interested incremental association of 
information security disclosures above and beyond what is provided by book value, 
earnings or future earnings potential. 
                                                 





One of the main objections for the levels-based research in general, and more 
specifically for the cross-sectional pooled research design, is the underlying 
assumption that the estimated coefficients are constant across time, as well as for all 
the firms (Lang and Lundholm 1996a).  Furthermore, previous research has 
documented that firms’ stock prices are also a function of many other factors, 
including time series parameters of their earnings process, their own systematic risk, 
and their information environment (see e.g. Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and 
Kothari 1989; Easton and Zmijewski 1989).  Therefore, careful consideration of 
“correlated omitted variables” is required to ensure that coefficients are not biased.  
Consequently, I used the following additional controls, in addition to the ones 
mentioned above. 
First, any economy-wide changes might have an impact on all of the firm’s 
earnings i.e., exogenous growth in the economy as a whole.  To control for these 
effects, and to reduce cross-correlation, indicator (dummy) variables for each year 
should be employed (Barth et al. 1999; Kerstein and Kim 1995; Collins and Kothari 
1989).  Therefore, I use dummy variables for each year with the assumption that 
coefficients for all the firms are same and any temporal change is reflected through 
intercept (e.g., Collins and Kothari 1989; Kerstein and Kim 1995).  Furthermore, it 
could be the case that pooling is inappropriate if there are shifts in the cross-sectional 
parameters over time (e.g., technology changes, competition laws and regulations) or 
if the error terms are correlated.  To account for these misspecifications,  I also 




Second, previous research also documents that there might be industry-
specific effects, and imposing a strict constant coefficient restriction might unduly 
affect the coefficient’s estimates (Wild 1992).  Therefore it is important to control for 
omitted variables related to industry membership (Aboody et al. 2004a).  To account 
for the industry-wide affects, two approaches have been used in the literature to deal 
with this issue: 1) use an industry indicator variable (Barth et al. 1992; Aboody et al. 
2004b) at least in the cross-sectional pooled regression and, 2) conduct separate 
industry-wide regression (Lang and Lundholm 1996a; Wild 1992).  Therefore, I use 
industry dummies in the main regression model.   
Furthermore, for my specific research question, where I am looking partially 
at a type of disclosure (information security related activities), it could be the case 
that the firms that I have identified as providing disclosures is a biased sample.  
Simply stated, it could be the case that the firms providing security-related disclosure, 
in general, provide more disclosures (i.e., it is a high disclosure firm).  If that were 
indeed the case, then ceteris paribus, the disclosure dummies would be significant 
across all the industry groups (since these firms are high-disclosing firms and 
generally, market values firm that disclose more information).  Thus, I re-estimate the 
following equation for each industry group: 
it
k




43210  (6) 
4.4 Sample 
Based on the findings of Kotulic and Clark (2004), I decided against using 




security research was the availability of public information, considerable time, and 
effort was spent towards identifying a public source, and developing techniques and 
methods to collect it (discussed in detail in the next section).  Thus, one of the 
hallmarks of this research is that the entire sample for security reporting was gathered 
from public sources.  Additionally, as the main objective of the research is to find the 
effect of security-related disclosure to the firm value, appropriate financial data as 
discussed above was gathered as well, and matched.  
4.4.1 Security Disclosures 
The focus of the paper is towards the firm-level effects, or more specifically, 
the market valuation of firms’ voluntarily disclosure of their information security 
security-related activities.  Therefore, the appropriate level of disclosure data is firm-
level disclosure.  Healy and Palepu (2001) details that managers possessing superior 
information could use various mechanism accessible to them to disseminate the 
information.  These mechanisms include annual general meeting, analyst phone 
conversation, management forecast, earning forecasts, press releases and news 
coverage.  Among these many venues, annual filings is also one such mechanism.  
Although annual reports are required by law (SEC mandates certain financial 
disclosures for all publicly-traded firms), these reports also provides a means for 
management to voluntarily disclose information above and beyond what is required, 
and at their own discretion.  For example, management discussion and analysis is one 
section that provides strategic insights by the managers for the future direction of the 
organization, and is highly regarded by analysts in their evaluation of managements 




studies have also used annual reports to developed either their own disclosure index 
(Botosan 1997), or to study the effect of disclosure for multi-audience environment 
(Bhojraj et al. 2004), or to measure the effect of non-financial information on the 
security prices of the organization (Amir and Lev 1996).  There are three main 
advantages of concentrating on annual filings.  First, by default, the sample is focused 
on those firms that are publicly-traded.  Second, under the SEC legislation, the 
information about these firms is available to all the prospective parties.  Third, such a 
sample would have the related financial information in public domain that would 
facilitate evaluating the effect of disclosure on the firm market value.  Thus, I decided 
to focus on the annual filings to identify the security disclosures. 
One possible method to identify the firms that made security disclosure was to 
gather the annual reports of representative samples of firms from the pool of all 
publicly-traded organization, and then manually go through all of them.  However, 
this procedure would be too time consuming, and might include a selection bias based 
on the firms that got selected in the first place.  Notwithstanding the fact that it might 
also be the case that sample firms selected for evaluation might not have any 
information security-related disclosure in the first place.  Therefore, the consensus 
was to focus on two years of annual filings, to see if voluntary information security 
disclosures are available.  The annual filings for all the public filers were searched 
using keywords.  The keyword list included the words that have already been used 
(see e.g., Campbell et al. 2003), and were supplemented with additions by browsing 
popular security literature.  For the initial analysis, a list of 20 keywords, such as 




were compiled through discussions with my co-chairs.  These keywords were then 
used on Lexis-Nexus, FreeEdgar and 10Kwizard databases.  Each of the annual 
reports that had a keyword hit was read to see what, if any, types of security-related 
disclosures were being provided by the firms.   
4.4.2 Security Disclosures Taxonomy 
The sample of reports that included computer security-related disclosures 
were independently read by three reviewers to see if a possible taxonomy for these 
disclosures could be developed.  The plan for having a taxonomy was two-fold: i.e., 
not only to identify the ‘type’ of disclosure that will capture the essence of 
information content of the disclosure (i.e., to be able to generalize to all the 
industries); but also to narrow it down enough to facilitate cross-sectional 
comparison.  The latter is important since there is no standard format for security-
related reporting, and each firm uses its own reporting styles.  Based on the available 
sample of two years, a consensus was achieved to classify the disclosures as either 
“proactive security measures,” or “potential security vulnerability,” or an “actual 
security breach” category.  
The first category encompasses the firms that report current activities, and the 
steps that they are taking to improve the security of their systems.  This category is 
titled “proactive security measures,” and includes examples of firms that disclose 
either using specific technology, such as encryption, secure socket layers data 
transmission, implementation of network security measures, or disclose a computer 
security policy.  The second category comprises “potential security vulnerability,” 




(i.e., they acknowledge a susceptibility for their computer systems, or admit that their 
infrastructure is at risk of being disrupted by computer viruses or hacking).  The third 
category titled “actual security breaches,” captures the fact that the firm revealed an 
actual beach had occurred (i.e., these disclosures explicitly consist of reports that 
details ‘denial-of-service’ attacks, or hackers penetrating the information system 
infrastructure).  In addition, if the company’s report itemizes an actual security 
breach, along with proactive security measures and vulnerabilities, then that single 
firm would get classified in each of the three categories independently. 
For each type of disclosure, the firm was coded as 1 if the disclosure was 
present, and 0 otherwise.  As mentioned before, a firm issuing multiple types of 
disclosures would be categorized for each type of disclosure.  Additionally, an overall 
generic disclosure index was also developed where the firm was coded as having a 
disclosure if it provided disclosure in any category i.e., generic disclosure was coded 
as 1 if either the proactive security, or potential vulnerability, or actual security 
breach type disclosure was available, and 0 otherwise.  See the appendix for samples 
of disclosures that were coded as 1 for each type of security disclosure. 
4.4.3 Overall Sample 
Pre-test sample results showed that about 30% of the firms that were 
identified by keywords actually had an information security-related disclosure.  Thus, 
it was decided to expand the sample to include all the industries from years 2000 to 
2004.  The lower cut-off of 2000 was selected for two main reasons: 1) security 
breaches were not a main concern for managers until 2000-2001, (i.e., in early 2001 




consequence of doing real-time operations), and 2) keep the data collection 
manageable7.  The upper cut-off of 2004 is restricted due to the fact that 2004 is the 
latest year for which majority of the annual filings reports and financial data was 
available. 
To collect the sample, 24 keywords (see Table 1) were used in a meta-search 
engine.  All the annual filings8 (specifically 10-K, 10KSB and 20-F) that were filed 
with the SEC during 2000-2004 were searched.  10-K is the official annual financial 
document that companies file with the SEC, and it contains detailed financial 
statements and financial footnotes.  10KSB is a modified 10-K annual report, and is 
filed by companies whose revenues are less than US$ 25 Million, is a U.S. or 
Canadian issuer, is not an investment firm, and if a majority owned subsidiary, then 
the parent is also a small business (SEC-2345).  Finally, 20-F is the annual form that 
is required to be submitted by foreign private holder issuing equity in U.S. pursuant to 
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (Securities Exchange Act of 
1934).  Table 1 shows that the ‘security measure(es)’ keyword has the highest number 
of hits – 2,211– followed by ‘authentication’ which has 1,823 instances.  As expected 
‘encryption,’ ‘computer virus(es),’ ‘security breach(es)’ follows with 1,411, 1,277, 
and 1,209 occurrences respectively.  However, the most surprising of all the 
keywords is ‘disaster recovery,’ which had a hit rate of approximately 1,200.  It 
seems that firms, besides worrying about computer viruses and implementing 
computer security technology, are also concerned with disaster recovery plans.  It is 
                                                 
7 Furthermore, the lower bound of 2000 is selected because the Y2K effect might confound the effect 
of information security related activities with other Information Technology expenditures. 
8 Besides 10-K reports, companies also issue Annual Reports to stockholders.  A quick search of the 




however in-line with the recommendations of trade publications, security magazines, 
and news reports that have continuously touted establishing disaster recovery plans as 
important part of an organizations repertoire of measures against potential security 
threats.  Furthermore, it is also instructive to note that there are not many occurrences 
of ‘security expenditures’ (7 instances) and unlisted results of (keyword) ‘security 
investments’ returned high false positives, and as such was not used 9. 
An annual filing was included in the sample if it included an occurrence of 
one or more of these keywords.  The firms were then collated in a database such that 
multiple instances of keywords for a single firm were associated with the particular 
firm in the year in which the security disclosure occurred.  To get a better feel of the 
‘type’ of disclosure, 200 words around the keyword were recorded and downloaded 
in a database.  The text around the keyword is required to ensure that the reporting 
was classified appropriately in one of the three categories identified above.  
Maintaining all the information in a database allows a permanent record that can be 
revisited later for further analysis and/or accountability.  Additionally, a hyperlink 
(static Uniform Resource Locater – URL) to each keyword occurrence was also 
recorded to allow direct access to annual reports10 filed with the SEC, in the event 
that 200 words text was ambiguous.  The total sample was 11,160 firms-years, which 
was reduced to 6,485 firms-years when the firms with missing ticker symbol, and 
                                                 
9 Stock investments are also referred to as security investments; due to high number of false hits (i.e., 
text containing mentions of company stock as opposed to information security investment, the 
keyword was dropped. 
10 Annual reports and annual filings are used interchangeably throughout. However, they refer to the 




those whose fiscal year other than December were discarded11.  The 6,485 firm-year 
sample was then manually read to identify and categorize the information security 
disclosure (if reported).  Concurrently, the firm’s Permanent identification number 
(PERMNO) was also identified based on the Chicago Research Security Prices 
(CRSP) 2004 annual securities identification file12.  
Table 2 summaries the selection process of the disclosing versus non-
disclosing firms-years.  As can be seen from the table, that total number of firms 
providing any security-related disclosure was 2,479.  To be included in the final 
sample, the firms should not have missing identifiers (PERMNO that cannot be 
matched) or missing financial information.  Furthermore, the firms (both disclosing 
and non-disclosing firms) must have a positive book value which is consistent with 
previous accounting research, especially for the price levels regression (Hayn 1995; 
Collins et al. 1997), and also should not be in the top or bottom 1 percentile range 
(influential observations) for financial variables.  The latter step is to mitigate the 
extreme effects of influential observations due to their transitory nature (e.g., see 
Kothari and Shanken 2003, p. 76; Collins et al. 1997).  Therefore, a firm is included 
in my sample if the following criteria are met: no missing financial information; 
positive book value; not missing industry classification; and is not considered an 
influential observation.  Thus, the final sample consists of 21,120 firm-year 
observations of which 1,637 observations are for the disclosing sample, and 19,483 
observations are for the control group.  Table 3 (Panel A) shows the industry 
                                                 
11 The reason for discarding firms with fiscal year not ending in December is discussed in more detail 
in the financial sample section. 
12 CRSP database classifies each firm using a permanent identifier (PERMNO) which is required for 




membership mapping which is based on the two digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code for Fama and French (1997) industry classification as 
provided by Bhojraj et al. (2003), while Panel B lists the 35 unique industry groups 
that are represented in my sample. 
Breakdown of the security-related disclosures and their distribution according 
to the type of disclosures (i.e., security vulnerability, proactive security measure or 
actual security breach) is listed in Table 4.  It is important to note that the disclosure 
(dummy) variable takes on a value one if a firm reports any of the three types of 
information security activities related disclosures (i.e., it is a joint representation of 
any one or combination of different types of disclosures by a firm).  For example, 
there are 757 instances (panel A column 2 Table 4) of firms disclosing only proactive 
security measures, but nothing about their systems vulnerability or actual security 
breaches.  Additionally, there are 1,258 instances (panel A group 6 Table 4) where 
firms not only disclosed system vulnerabilities, but also provided disclosures related 
to proactive security measures.  However, since the latter are joint occurrences of 
proactive measures and potential system vulnerabilities, the overall disclosure index 
is 1,258 (column 5 Table 4), reflecting the fact that an information security-related 
disclosures was provided.  
For the original sample of 2,479 disclosing firms, it is interesting to note that 
among the three categories of the disclosures, most of the disclosures relate to 
proactive security measures (2,090) being implemented by firms.  Of the total 
potential systems vulnerability disclosures (1,716), 1,258 disclosures relate to 




measure, while only 374 instances strictly relate to the vulnerabilities.  For the bulk of 
reports involving actual security breaches (73 instances), the firms provided 
information about their security measures, while at the same time maintained that the 
systems are still susceptible to further security intrusions.  Table 4 Panel B shows that 
there are 5,815 unique firms in the sample, of which 86.13% do not disclose.  The 
total sample consists of 807 (5,818-5,011) disclosing firms, of which 
49.32% (398/807) firms have disclosed only once, while over 50% of the disclosing 




Chapter 5   
Results and Discussion 
5.1 Disclosure Characteristics 
Overall, the number of disclosures has been increasing steadily, and has 
almost doubled from just 331 in year 2000 to over 700 by year 2004 (Figure 1).  A 
similar pattern can be seen in types of security disclosures in Figure 2, where reports 
regarding proactive security measure and potential security vulnerabilities have 
increased with an annual cumulative growth rate of approximately 25% and 24%, 
respectively over the sample period (i.e., 2000-04).  However, the number of actual 
security breach disclosures increased from 5 in 2000 to 24 by 2003, and then 
decreased to 10 for year 2004.  It is also interesting to note that even though the 
numbers of disclosures are on an increase (Figure 3), the percentage distribution 
among the three categories of disclosures is quite stable across all the five years i.e., 
about 53% of disclosures relate to proactive security measures, while about 43% 
relate to system vulnerabilities.  
Figure 4 shows the types of companies disclosing, based on filing status of   
10-K, 10-KSB or 20-F, wherein the bulk of disclosures are provided by 10-K filers 
i.e., US-based large firms.  For example, for year 2000, 377 disclosures were by the 
10-K filers, while 10-KSB and 20-F companies supplied only 8 and 11 disclosures 
respectively.  For 2004, both 10-K and 10-KSB disclosures more than doubled, 
however, the 20-F disclosures tripled.  On a percentage composition basis (Figure 5), 




K filers decreased from 90% to about 5% for 2000-4.  It seems that on a company-
wide basis, the foreign company disclosures are on the rise. 
5.2 Industry-Wide Disclosure Characteristics 
Summary disclosures by industry are presented in Table 5 (sorted in 
descending order by column 6).  Banks and business services comprise two of the 
largest industry segments having approximately 3,000 observations each.  Drugs, 
Financial Services, Chips, and the Lab Equipment industries follow with a cumulative 
number of observations of 5,460 firm-years.  These six segments represent about 
54.53% of the total sample. 
Table 5 (column 6) shows that for disclosing firms, approximately 42.21% of 
disclosures are being provided by the Business Services group alone.  The next 
biggest sector is Banks, which contributes about 13.68% of the total 1,637 disclosures 
in my sample.  Overall, 89.07% (column 9 of Table 5) of security-related disclosures 
are offered by less than one-third of the industry groups i.e., 10 industry segments.  
The next 5 industries account for an additional 6% of total disclosures, making a total 
of 95.85% reported by 15 industries.  In terms of sample size, the 15 industries 
comprise about 80% of the total sample.  
Among all the industries, the Business Services sector leads the others where 
23.44% (column 7 of Table 5) of all the firms provide security disclosures.  The 
Business Services sector is followed by Retail, wherein approximately 15% of the 
firms disclose.  About 11% of firms in each of the Insurance and Telecommunication 




firms in each group disclosed, which is lower than the Books, Personal Services and 
Wholesales industry segments.  Overall, it appears that security disclosures are fairly 
evenly distributed, with the majority of the disclosures being concentrated within the 
services industry segments, and firms that are customer-facing. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics for the full sample, disclosing firms and non-disclosing 
firms, are shown in Table 6 panels A, B and C respectively, while their correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 7.  Panel A of Table 6 shows that the mean equity market 
value of the sample is about US$ 3 Billion, with a range of US $ 12,000 to over 
US$ 400 billion.  Mean (median) net earnings of all the firms are 48 (44) cents per 
share, while the mean (median) stock price is US$ 17.40 (13.13) per share.  Even 
though the mean book value of equity is about US$ 1.23 billion, the median is only 
US$ 131.42 million, indicating that the sample includes firms with a large book 
value. 
For disclosing firms (Table 6 panel B), average stock price for the five year 
period is about US$ 16.30 per share, which is about US$ 1.19 less than the non-
disclosing firms’ (Table 6 panel C) stock price of US$ 17.49 per share.  The mean 
earnings for disclosing firms is 14 cents per share, compared to 51 cents per share for 
non-disclosing firms, yet, the minimum and maximum are relatively the same.  




shares outstanding are all greater for the disclosing firms as compared to the non-
disclosing firms13.  
In the correlation matrix, (Table 7), I find the usual positive and significant 
correlations between price, market values, earnings and book values.  However, for 
disclosures proxies, the case is quite interesting.  First, proactive security measures 
are positively correlated to market value, book value, and number of shares 
outstanding and are statistically significant at p < 0.001.  Potential vulnerability 
disclosure is only positively correlated with number of shares outstanding, while 
actual security breach is not statistically significant with market value, book value, or 
stock price.  Both proactive security measures, and potential vulnerability disclosures 
have a negative and statistically significant relation to stock price with a p-
value < 0.10, and p-value < 0.000 respectively.  Finally, for proactive security 
measure and potential vulnerability the relationship is negative and significant at 
p < 0.001.  While for actual security breach disclosures, the correlation is also 
negative and significant, but at p < 0.05.  Thus, it appears that larger firms with lower 
than average earnings are the ones that are providing security-related disclosures.  
While actual security measures are not correlated with stock price, proactive security 
measures and potential vulnerabilities would tend to decrease the price. 
5.4 Main Results 
The main results of the cross-sectional pooled regression are presented in 
Table 8.  In all of the regressions, the dependent variable is the firm’s stock price 
three month after fiscal year close.  In total, there are five different regressions.  The 
                                                 




first model is the base case without a disclosure dummy proxy.  Two different models 
are used to investigate the effect of a generic information security disclosure, as well 
as using proxies for various types of disclosures.  Finally, models using disclosure 
proxies are estimated on a reduced sample, which excludes firms from Banks and 
Financial Industries as these segments are subject to unique governmental regulations 
including Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.    
For information security disclosures, I first use a generic “disclosure” measure 
(Model 2) i.e., a dummy variable equal to 1, if a firm had any ‘type’ of disclosure, 
and estimate Model 2 and 4 respectively.  To get a better understanding of the 
relationship of each type of information security related disclosure, I use dummy 
variables representing the seven groups (as detailed in Table 4 panel A) related to 
proactive security disclosures, potential vulnerabilities disclosures, actual security 
breaches, and their combination in Models 3 and 5.  Model 3 is estimated using the 
full sample of 21,120 observations, while Model 5 is the reduced version (i.e., 
excluding Finance and Banking firms), and is estimated using 16,607 observations.  
In the reduced sample, the firms from Finance and Banking industries are eliminated, 
since these are regulated industries, and might have unique coefficients of their own.  
In the base case (Model 1), I use book value per share (BVPS), earnings per share 
(EPS), growth measure (Q = MV/BV), year and industry dummies as explanatory 
variables.  I checked for heteroscedasticity using White’s test, and fail to accept the 
null that error terms are homoskedastic (White 1980). Therefore, all reported t-




As expected, the coefficient on BVPS, EPS and Q are positive and significant 
in the base case with an R2 of 0.58.  The magnitude of the coefficient, and the model 
fit is similar to the findings of the previous accounting studies using price–levels 
models (see e.g. Aboody et al. 2004b).  As discussed above, Model 2 shows the result 
of regressing the generic disclosure measure along with base model variables.  The 
coefficient on the disclosure dummy has a magnitude of 2.394, is positive and 
statistically significant at p < .001.  In Model 4, the coefficient on the disclosure 
variable is again positive and statistically significant (p < .001).  However, the 
magnitude on the disclosure variable in Model 4 is 2.484, which is slightly higher 
than the estimated coefficient in Model 2.  Model 3 (Model 5) supports the results 
that disclosures of proactive security measures (P) and potential vulnerability (V) are 
positive and statistically significant (p < .001) with coefficients magnitudes of 3.054 
(3.157) and 1.491 (1.636) respectively.  The estimated coefficient on actual security 
breaches is not statistically significant, but has a negative coefficient in Models 3 and 
5.  Joint disclosures of PV (i.e., proactive security measures and potential 
vulnerabilities), and PVA are significant at p < 0.001, and positively related to stock 
price.  In addition, joint disclosures of PA, even though positive, is only marginally 
significant (p < 0.1) in Model 3, but is more significant (p < 0.05) in Model 5.  
Interestingly, joint disclosures of VA (i.e., potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach) is not significant at any reasonable significance level, but has a positive 
coefficient of 0.527 and 0.758 in Models 3 and 5, respectively.  It is also noteworthy 
that the estimated coefficient on VA is smaller than other information security related 




related activities have a positive affect on a firm’s stock price.  On further inspection, 
it seems that disclosures of proactive security measures have the most value-
relevance to a firm’s stock price.  Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis that security 
disclosures do not affect market price. 
5.5 Year-to-Year Results 
As I am using a cross-sectional pooled analysis and controlling for the year 
effect, it could be that the results are inconsistent if there are shifts in cross-sectional 
parameters over time (e.g., new technology), or if the errors are autocorrelated.  
Furthermore, market sentiment for disclosures of information security related-
activities might change over time.  Therefore, I re-ran the model for each year for 
each of the disclosures types (generic and the seven groups).  For these regressions, 
the same base model is used (Model 1 Table 8) with the only exception that the year 
dummies are not included.  The results of these regressions are presented in Table 9.  
Panel A shows the progression of generic disclosure over years 2000-04.  The 
coefficient on the variable is positive and significant (p < 0.001) in all the five years.  
The model fit R2 varies between 0.558 and 0.639.  BVPS, EPS and Q are relatively 
the same across all five years.  Interestingly, the magnitude on the coefficient is 
largest in year 2001 (3.032), while it is smallest (2.003) for year 2003. 
Results of the types of disclosures of information security activities (seven 
groups as discussed before) are detailed in Panel B (Table 9).  Coefficient on the 
proactive security measure (P) disclosure is significant (p < 0.001) in four of the five 
years (i.e., in year 2002 it is not significant).  Potential vulnerability (V) disclosure is 




estimated coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant.  However, the most 
interesting trends are found in the joint disclosures.  The estimated coefficient on PV 
is positive and statistically significant in all five years.  PA-related disclosures are 
positive and significant in year 2003 (p < 0.001) only, while PVA disclosures are 
positive for the five years, but statistically significant only in years 2001-03.  For the 
VA disclosures, it seems that in the earlier years, 2000-01, market seems to value the 
joint disclosures positively.  However by the year 2004, joint disclosures of VA have 
a negative and significant effect at p < 0.05.  As listed in panel A, the R2 of the model 
has a range of 0.558-0.638. 
5.6 Industry-Wide Results 
As discussed in the hypothesis section, industry memberships also have 
consequences on the estimated coefficient; therefore I conduct industry-wide analysis.  
Additionally, if the information security disclosure proxy variable is picking up the 
effect of other ‘omitted-variables’ (i.e., the firms being high disclosers), then its 
coefficient in all the industry analysis would be significant.  Industry-wide results are 
tabulated in Table 10, whereas before, the generic security disclosure, and regression 
on various types of disclosures are listed in panel A and panel B of Table 10 
respectively.  Since these regressions are for firms in an industry group over time-
period 2000-2004, I include year dummy variables to control for year-effects. 
For generic disclosure (Panel A), fourteen industry segments have either a 
significant or a marginally significant coefficient.  Most notably Business Services, 
Paper, Retail, and Transportation industry segments are significant at p < 0.001.  For 




Services to 32.389 for Paper.  The Clothes, Healthcare, Insurance, Food and Toys 
industry groups have a significance of p < 0.05, while Chips and Lab Equipment 
segments have a statistical significance of p < 0.10 with a positive coefficient.  
However, for the Households and Steel industries, the disclosure coefficient is 
significant at p < 0.05 and negative.  The R2 for all the regressions varies between 
0.418-0.865.  The most interesting point to note in the panel A is that for both the 
Finance and Banking industries, the coefficient on information security disclosure 
activities dummy is positive, but not significant.  This finding confirms my previous 
expectations, since both these industries are heavily regulated under GLB, which 
requires firms in these industries to actively enforce and maintain information 
security procedures.  Accordingly, as these organizations are already regulated, then 
any voluntary disclosure of information security activity should not have any effect 
on the firm’s price, since that is what the market expects anyway.  
Panel B (Table 10) details the regression analysis on the various types of 
information security disclosures for the 35 industry segments.  Proactive security 
disclosures (P) is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.001 in the Business 
Services and Transportation industries, while for Banks it is significant at p < 0.05 
and positive.  The potential vulnerability (V) is positive and significant at p < 0.001 in 
Clothes, Healthcare, and Paper segments.  However, for the Books and Wholesale 
sectors, the coefficient is significant at p < 0.001 and negative.  Actual security 
breach (A) has a mixed sign across industries, but is not significant at any statistical 
level (p < 0.10).  Across industries, PV is positive and statistically significant 




industries.  PA is either not significant, or if statistically significant (p < 0.001), then 
only for the Business Services sector.  VA has a mixed sign across industries where it 
is positive and significant (p < 0.001) for Wholesale industry, but negative and 
significant at p < 0.05 for Personal Services sectors.  Finally, PVA is also positive 
and significant (P < 0.001) for the Business Services, Transportation and Wholesale 
industries. 
Overall, consistent with the main results (cross-sectional pooled design, Table 
8), the proactive security measure disclosure has the most effect on price.  
Additionally, industries like Business Services, Clothes, Retail, Insurance, and 
Transportation are the ones where the information security related disclosures have 
most significance.  All these industries rely heavily on online e-commerce, and 
interact with sensitive customer data.  However, for Banks and Financial industries, 
the market does not seem to be reacting to any disclosures of information security 
related activities.  Thus, the industry analysis seems to corroborate the cross-sectional 
pooled analysis, and provides support that my proxy for information security 
disclosure has merit. 
5.7 Discussion 
Overall, it seems that larger firms tend to disclose security-related activities 
more often than the smaller firms.  Even though the mean stock price and the standard 
deviation of the price are not that different between the two groups, the average 
earnings for the reporting firms is 37 cents (per share) lower than the non-disclosing 




and various categories of disclosures are generally negative and statistically 
significant. 
The main empirical findings of the research are shown in Table 8, which is a 
cross-sectional pooled regression.  It appears that disclosure, in general, is positively 
and significantly related to stock prices.  Even though the model fit is not that 
different from the base case i.e., the additional variable does not improve the model 
fit, it still helps explain 59% of the variation.  However, the main interesting finding 
is that the coefficient on disclosures of information security activities is positive and 
significant.  For individual categories of disclosure, it appears that the proactive 
security measures dominate other types of disclosures (i.e., the price is positively and 
significantly related to disclosures of proactive security measures).  
For year-to-year regression, the results are somewhat interesting.  First, 
generic security reporting regression shows that disclosures are significant for each 
year.  The magnitude of coefficient on year 2001 is the highest (3.032) while for year 
2002 it is the lowest (2.003).  The model fit parameter changes slightly from 0.558 in 
year 2000 to 0.639 for year 2004 indicating that with time, investors are getting more 
knowledgeable about this intangible disclosure.  For individual types of disclosures, 
proactive security activities’ (P) reporting is positive and significant across the study 
time-period.  However, disclosures of potential vulnerability (V) seem to have an 
effect (positive and significant) in year 2004 alone, while actual security breaches (A) 
disclosure occur only in year 2003, but has a negative coefficient that is statistically 
insignificant.  Furthermore, for the joint disclosures (PV, PA, VA, PVA), it appears 




positive and statistically significant.  Interestingly, joint disclosures of VA are 
positive in the early years (2001-02), but for year 2004, VA disclosures have a 
negative (p < 0.05) effect on the price.  Thus, the empirical evidence supports that the 
proactive security measures are consistently economically significant.  
Overall, I find empirical support that the market values discretionary 
disclosure of security.  Additionally, the results also empirically corroborate 
Einhorn’s (2005) theoretical price model, which shows that the coefficient on 
voluntary disclosure will be positive, if the correlation between the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures is negative.  However, these results do not rule out the 
alternative hypothesis that since these firms have lower earnings and a somewhat 
depressed stock price, they are “high” disclosers, and the indicator variable is 
detecting the effect of high numbers of disclosures as opposed to information 
security-related information. 
If that is the case, then a prior, I would assume that I would find significance 
on this indicator variable across all industry groups as well.  However, for the 
industry-wide analysis (Table 10), it seems that not all industry groups have 
significance.  In general, my analysis reveals that fourteen industries have statistically 
significant disclosure coefficients, and all of them except two, have positive 
magnitudes.  The firms in these industries (Business Services, Clothes, Retail, 
Insurance Healthcare, and Transportation14) are not only technologically advanced, 
but are also data dependent.  Furthermore, these firms rely heavily on online 
initiatives, which increase their vulnerability, and consequently make them cognizant 
                                                 




of information security concerns.  It should also be noted that information security 
investments could have the potential to generate revenue for a firm (i.e., competitive 
advantage). Consumers would have a higher trust with firms that are actively engaged 
in protecting the information, and thus, would increase the cash flow for the firm. On 
the other hand, security disclosures by firms in other industry sectors, such as 
Automobiles and Books (Printing and Publishing) that do not have a consumer focus, 
seem to be insignificant.  Finally, since government has already mandated 
organizations in Banking and Financial industries to implement information security 
procedures (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999), it is not surprising that the information 
security disclosures in these industries are insignificant.  In fact, the non-significant 
results provide further support for the information security activities disclosure proxy, 
in that the proxy variable represents the affect of voluntary disclosures of information 




Chapter 6  
Robustness Analysis 
These results are based on the most parsimonious of models to explore the 
effects of voluntary disclosures.  To further check the consistency of results, the 
following robustness checks are conducted. 
6.1 Additional Proxies Check- Size and Abnormal Earnings 
Aboody et al. (2004b, p. 255) suggests using an additional variable in the 
model that proxy for future earning potential, and recommends using mean year-end 
analyst’s earnings growth forecast.  As discussed in the methodology section, I proxy 
for the future earning potential by using the ratio of market-value to book-value (Q).  
However, to be consistent with the prior literature, I re-estimate the model using 
mean year-end analysts’ earnings growth forecast.  Untabulated results showed that 
there is no material difference in my main findings.  Additionally, one of the main 
concerns for the price-levels model is the biasing of the estimated coefficients due to 
scale effects.  Therefore, I use the log of assets (lnassets) as a proxy for firm size in 
addition to scaling by the number of shares outstanding.  Results of the expanded 
model (untabulated) adding the lnassets variable do not alter the results in any 
significant manner. 
6.2 Returns Model 
Based on the prior discussion on methodology, the question of which model to 




interest, and on econometric concerns (Landsman and Magliolo 1988).  The main 
difference between the two types of analysis is that the former is interested in 
determining what is reflected in the firm value, and the latter is interested in 
addressing the question, “What is reflected in changes in value over a specific period 
of time?” (Barth et al. 2001, p. 95 emphasis added).  Thus, it is imperative that 
appropriate specification is selected based on the question under consideration.  That 
is, if the concern is more of timeliness rather than association of value relevance of 
accounting information, then returns model is the appropriate specification.  Although 
not necessarily required, but as Kothari and Zimmerman (1995, p. 34) notes, the use 
of both price and return model specifications has the potential to further corroborate 
the results. Following this suggestion, Amir and Lev (1996) and Aboody et al. 
(2004b, p. 255) also use a combined methodology in their studies.  However Aboody 
and Lev (1998 , p. 170) cautions that “an association between unexpected [items] and 
the contemporaneous annual stock returns indicates the extent to which the 
information contained in [items] is consistent with that used by investors (such and 
association test cannot, of course, indicate whether investors actually used [items] 
data in assessing security values).”  Thus, I estimate the following return model15: 
Annretit = α0+α1*Disit+α2*EPSSit+α3*∆EPSit+α4*∆Qit+Σ αj∗Indusit+εit (7) 
Where: 
Annretit  = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 months before 
‘t’ to 3 months after ‘t’ 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that econometrically, the returns model is actually a first-difference price model 
scaled by the prior-period price.  The intuition behind using the return model is that first differencing 




EPSSit = Earnings per share for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, scaled by previous year-
end EPS 
∆EPSSit = Change in EPSt-EPSt-1 scaled by previous year beginning EPS for 
firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
∆Q = Changes in Q (MVt/BVt) i.e., Qt-Qt-1 for each firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 
Dis = Proxy variable for “types” of disclosure being analyzed.  I use three 
regression specifications as follows: 
1) Base model without any disclosure variables, 
2) Generic security disclosure, where Dis = 1 if proactive security 
measure or potential security vulnerability or actual security 
breaches =1, 0 otherwise, 
3) For the second regression, I add the following six dummy variables 
in place of Dis to proxy for the following groups: 
i. proactive security disclosures, where P = 1 if proactive 
security measure =1, 0 otherwise, 
ii. Potential security vulnerabilities (V), where V= 1 if potential 
security vulnerability =1, 0 otherwise, 
iii. Actual security breaches disclosures, where A = 1 if actual 




iv. Joint disclosures of proactive security measures and potential 
vulnerabilities, where PV = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
v. Joint disclosures of potential vulnerabilities and actual 
security breach, where VA = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
vi. Joint disclosures of proactive security measures and actual 
breaches, where PA = 1 if there is a joint disclosure, 0 
otherwise, 
vii. Joint disclosure of proactive security measures, potential 
vulnerabilities and actual security breaches, where PVA = 1 
if joint disclosure, 0 otherwise 
Industry =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
The results of pooled cross-sectional analysis of returns model is presented in 
Table 11.  Similar to Table 8, I estimate five models, where three models (1,2,3) are 
analyzed using full sample of 21,120 observations, while Models 4, and 5 are 
estimated using sample excluding firms from Banking and Financial industries.  
Consistent to levels analysis, I find that the generic information security disclosure 
(Model 2 and 4) is positive and significant (p < 0.001).  Further analysis of types of 
information security disclosure provides some interesting findings.  Model 3 shows 
that proactive security measure (P) is not significant, while potential vulnerability (V) 




positive and significant (p < 0.05).  Coefficients on PA and VA are not significant 
and negative, as compared to positive in levels models.  However, a couple of 
interesting points from the returns models are that P becomes positive and significant 
(p < 0.05) when the sample exclude Banking and Financial firms (Model 5), and 
coefficient on actual security breaches (A) is positive and significant (Models 3, and 
5).  Overall, it appears that disclosures of proactive security measure have a positive 
and statistically significant effect (i.e., the market values them).  The positive 
coefficient on the actual security breaches might be due to the fact that the market had 
reacted quite negatively on the original breach news, but over a long window16, the 
market compensates these firms. 
6.3 Matched-Pair Analysis  
To further check the consistency of the results, and to investigate if 
significance in the model is due to the sample size, I re-ran the price (levels) models 
using a matched-pair design.  For this analysis, each disclosing firm is matched with a 
non-disclosing firm with the closet market value (equity) for a given year and 
industry.  The intuition behind matched-pair design is that by matching firms from 
same time-periods, industries, and size (market value), the ‘correlated omitted 
variables’ (including size, and risk characteristics) is mitigated.  Another advantage of 
matched-pair design is that if the results hold in a ‘smaller’ sample, then the findings 
are more robust.  However, one consequence of reducing the sample size is that the 
estimated coefficient might not have statistical significance.  
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The results of the price regression for the matched-pair sample are presented 
in Table 12.  The explanatory variables are similar to the ones included in the main 
results (i.e., year and industry dummies are also included).  For the matched-pair 
sample, I estimate four separate regressions.  Model 1 and 3 use the all the matched-
pairs, while in Models 3 and 4 (as before), Banks and Financial firms are excluded.  
The coefficient on generic disclosure is positive and still statistically significant (p < 
0.001).  The proactive security measure (Models 2 and 4) is also positive and 
statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Compared to the main results (Table 8) joint 
disclosures of PV, PA and PVA are again positive and significant (p < 0.05).  The 
coefficient on VA is also positive (similar to main results) and insignificant.  
However, potential vulnerability (V) is now insignificant on any statistical level while 
still being positive. 
Additionally, I estimate the returns equation for the matched-pair sample as 
well (Table 14).  Identical to the price levels, I estimate four separate regressions.  
However, in this analysis, I do not find any significance, except for the actual security 
breach (A) coefficient, which is significant and positive.  One possible explanation 
for this set of the results (as compared to the all firms sample – Table 11) is that the 
power of the test is weak.  Another possible explanation could be that previous 
literature has documented that disclosures of voluntary nature are endogenous, and 
not controlling for this endogeneity might be the cause for a lack of statistical 




6.4 Industry-Wide Returns Model 
In a similar vein, the results of returns regression on industry sectors are 
presented in Table 14.  Panel A shows the return regressions on the generic disclosure 
dummy variable, while panel B lists the results by various types of disclosures.  
Generic information security disclosures ( panel A Table 14) is positive and 
statistically significant only in three industries (Business Services, Household, and 
Smoke [tobacco products]) at p < 0.001, while for Telecommunications, the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant only at p < 0.05 and Meals 
(restaurants, hotels and motels)  have a marginal significance.  For the Steel industry, 
the disclosure coefficient is negative and significant (p < 0.001).  An examination of 
the individual types of disclosures on annual returns shows some interesting results as 
well (panel B Table 14).  The Business Services, Households, Machinery, Meals, and 
Smoke sectors all have positive proactive security measures (P) coefficient (p < 0.05).  
However, for the Banking and Finance sector, the coefficient is marginally significant 
(p < 0.10) and negative.  On the other hand, the potential vulnerability coefficient is 
always positive when it is statistically significant (Business Services, Paper, and Not-
classified industries).  Actual security breaches (A) is also positive and statistically 
significant for the Business Services sector.  Joint disclosures VA and PA are not 
significant in any industries, while PVA is positive and significant for the Business 
Services and Machinery sectors.  Joint disclosures of PV are negative for the Books 
and Miscellaneous industries, while for the Banks, Business Services, and 




Overall, there is no clear support from the returns model for the earlier (tabulated) 
price-levels results with the exception for the Business Services industry. 
6.5 Disclosures Endogeneity 
In almost all of the disclosures-related studies, disclosure is usually the 
dependent variable, and the idea is to find the determinants of the disclosures.  
However, in this research, the disclosure is used as an explanatory variable along with 
other independent variables.   Voluntary disclosures, in of themselves, are an ex ante 
commitment or policy to provide information, and is endogenously determined by the 
firm.  Specifically,  
“When a manager receives information at a point in time, the manager may 
ex-post choose to withhold or provide this information in order to correct mis-
valuation.  If the manager chooses to disclose this information, this disclosure will 
change the stock price.  However, firms with high disclosure quality will withhold 
less information.  Therefore, there are two effects: 1) disclosure quality [precision], 
which is the firms’ ongoing ex ante commitment to provide disclosure; and 2) 
“discretionary” disclosure, which is an ex post realization of this ex ante 
commitment” (Core 2001, p. 448).   
 
Therefore, any study that does not take into account the endogenous factors 
might run into the problem of spurious inferences.  Hence, one possible refinement to 
the model is to try to account for this endogenous effect.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
address the issue of voluntary disclosure in their study as well.  Specifically, they 
refer to the voluntary disclosure as a “self-selection” (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, p. 
99) issue.  The intuition behind the self-selection bias is that the firms choose to 
disclose information based on their own cost benefits analysis (i.e., the firms self 
select themselves to either provide a disclosure or not).  Thus, a simple OLS 




self-selection bias (Heckman 1978).  However, econometric methods are available 
that correct for the selection bias, while including the main effect of the variable on 
which the selection occurs  These models are referred to as “treatment effects” (e.g., 
Wooldridge 2002).  In its most simplistic form, a treatment model is characterized as 
follows:  
 iizixiy εδ ++=  (8) 
Where zi is an endogenous dummy variable on which selection occurs (i.e., 
the decision to obtain ‘treatment’ is modeled as an outcome of the unobserved latent 
variable, zi*, which is a linear function of covariates wi: 
 iii uwz += γ
*  (9) 
Where the observed decision is: 
zj  = 1, if zj* > 0 
0, otherwise 
Simply, the disclosure variable is an endogenous binary variable.  Ideally, 
endogenous variables can be consistently estimated using Instrument Variables 
(2 Stage Least Squares – 2SLS) models.  However, there are two issues that need to 
be addressed in self-selection models.  First, if I use the 2SLS method, the first stage 
equation would become a linear probability model since the dependent variable is 
binary, which has its own limitations.  Additionally, I am interested in the estimating 
the probability that a firm is either a discloser or not.  Therefore, a better model to use 
for estimation is a first stage Probit model.  Second, in the main equation of interest, I 




is in controlling for the omitted variables that might bias the coefficient based on the 
unobserved variables).  Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983) both show that such a 
model can be consistently estimated by using a two equation system (as shown 
above), and employing an inverse mills ratio (hazard of disclosing) as a proxy 
variable in the main equation of interest.  It is instructive to note that since the two 
equations are correlated, both of the equations need to be estimated simultaneously to 
ensure that the estimated variances are consistent.  Thus, the two equations model for 
my study becomes: 
 iii zD εγ +′=
*  (Disclosure Model)  (10) 
 iuixβiδDiP +′+=  (Value-relevance model)  (11) 
Where: 
xi  = includes all the variables defined for the main model (Eq. 5), the 
inverse mills ratio (i.e., probability [hazard] of issuing an information 
security-related disclosure) and the intercept term 
Di = 1 is the firm reporting choice (i.e., either proactive security disclosure 
or potential vulnerability or actual security breach = 1), 0 otherwise 
D*i =: unobserved choice variable of the firm, such that di =1 if d*i > 0, and 
di = 0 otherwise 




The main question thus, in estimating the treatment model is to identify the 
variables that effect firms’ disclosure choices.  In this regard, the extant literature is 
replete with studies of cross-sectional determinants of corporate disclosures.  
Specifically, I rely on Luez and Verrecchia (2000) and Field et al (2005) studies, 
since both the studies provide a comprehensive list of variables that affect a firms’ 
disclosures.  Based on the review of the two papers, following variables are 
identified: 
1. Firm performance  - Return on assets (operating income before extraordinary 
items/assets) 
2. Capital requirement (long term assets/assets – financing needs), 
3. Firm size (log of assets) 
4. Industry dummy variables (membership of industries affect disclosure) 
5. Liquidity – stock turnover ([1-Πt (1-volume tradedt/total sharest)]) 
6. Information asymmetry - Volatility (standard deviation of stock returns) 
7. Analyst following (total number of analysts following a firm) 
8. Institutional holding (percentage of shares held by institutions/total shares 
outstanding). 
The additional financial variables for the firms are collected from the Annual 
Combined CRSP/COMPUSTAT database.  Stock turnover and volatility is estimated 
using monthly CRSP file for volume of shares traded and returns.  Analyst following 




analysts issuing forecasts for a firm; and institutional holding is obtained from 
Thomson 13f database that provides information of number of shares held by 
institutions.  
The results of selection-controlled regression are presented in Table 15.  Panel 
A (Table 15) details the first stage Probit regression results that is used to estimate the 
inverse mills ratio.  The coefficient on the generic disclosure variable is positive and 
significant at 0.001 level, after controlling for the selection-bias (price model panel A 
Table 15).  The coefficient on EPS, BVPS, and Q exhibit the usual signs and 
significance.  The estimation on individual types of disclosure is presented in panel B 
(Table 15).  For these results, I estimate each type of disclosure independently (i.e., 
each selection model is run separately for the seven groups of information security 
disclosures).  As compared to the main results (Table 8), I find that the proactive 
security measures (P), and potential vulnerabilities (V) coefficients to be positive and 
significant at 0.001 levels.  Actual security breach (A), shows its consistent negative 
sign, but is not significant.  Joint disclosures of PA, and PVA are positive and 
significant at 0.001 levels, while PA is significant at 0.10 level.  Possibly the most 
interesting of all the finding is that of the joint disclosures of VA.  Compared to the 
main results (Table 8 where VA is not significant), the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at p < 0.001.  Additionally, the R2 for all the models are 
consistently above 0.57, indicating that the model does provide a reasonable fit. 
Overall, the previous conclusion that disclosures’ containing any mention of 
proactive security measures has a positive impact on the stock price, holds.  




breaches and still disclose that their systems are vulnerable, have a negative price 
association.  Intuitively, these finds make sense, as markets should reward firms that 
are undertaking steps to protect their information assets, and should penalize firms 




Chapter 7  
Conclusions, Limitations and Future Direction 
7.1 Contribution 
The main contributions of the study are: 1) an attempt to further our 
understanding regarding voluntary disclosures, specifically vis-à-vis qualitative 
managerial disclosures17; 2) an endeavor to contribute to the extant literature value 
relevance of non-financial information; 3) an addition to the information security 
literature concerning the value of information security-related activities to firms; and 
4) identifying a public source of information security data.  In addition, the study is 
an attempt to highlight an important area of research for accounting, particularly as 
we are now in an information-economy.  Under the new economy paradigm, 
information is the strategic tool that helps to gain a competitive advantage.  Thus, this 
asset needs to be protected and/or valued. 
Besides providing empirical support, this study also has practical managerial 
implications.  Perhaps one of the most important findings of the study is that 
information security disclosures matter.  Overall, market response for security 
disclosures is positive. In other words, voluntary disclosures of information security 
related disclosures help in increasing the firm value i.e., managers should report their 
security-related activities.  Consequently, the research also (indirectly) underscores 
the importance of information security investments.  Surveys by leading industry 
                                                 





practitioners (e.g., Berinato and Ware 2003) show that firms investing more in 
security are as susceptible to breaches as the ones that invest less18, which results in 
providing confounding signals to firms regarding the value of information security 
investments. In contrast to these surveys, the results of this study underscore the 
importance of market value of the expenditures on information security – at least the 
proactive security measures investments. Thus, management that thinks of security 
investments as nothing but “the cost of doing business,” should note that these 
investments, even though non-revenue generating, do provide value.  Accordingly, 
investment in information security might help firms to differentiate themselves, and 
provide a strategic competitive advantage.  Finally, if the market does not want to 
have more regulations imposed on them, then a policy of voluntary disclosure would 
be beneficial, for at least the short run, it would provide value to the firms. 
7.2 Future (Post-Dissertation) Directions 
This dataset provides unique opportunities to develop a stream of research.  
One such possibility is to use the same methodology in an international setting.  For 
example, an interesting extension would be to use European firms’ data, which face 
stringent European Union Privacy and more information protection regulations than 
US firms.  Another possible extension to the study is to attempt to match the 
voluntary disclosures in the annual filings to previously reported security breaches for 
the firms in the popular press (Campbell et al. 2003), and see if the market re-
                                                 
18 Berinato and Ware (2003) is a CIO magazine and PricewaterHouseCoopers sponsored survey. The 
finding of no differences in likelihood of security breach between high vs. low security investments 
could be the result of the companies sampled i.e., sample bias.  Furthermore, as opposed to 
investigating the probability of a security breach, this study is focused on the market-value of 
voluntary disclosures of information security related activities, including disclosures of proactive 




evaluates these firms differently.  Furthermore, as discussed previously, most of the 
voluntary disclosures studies are usually focused on identifying the determinants of 
the disclosures.  Therefore, another possibility that can be pursued is to study the 
determinants of voluntary disclosures of information security-related activities.  Even 
though I identify and use some explanatory variables (instruments) to correct for the 
self-selection of firms to voluntary disclose information security activities, the overall 
R2 (0.1495 – for the selection model Table 15 Panel A) is relatively small.  Thus, 
empirically testing determinants of voluntary disclosures of information security-
related activities will help us better understand the factors that effect the organizations 
in the information economy.  Last but not the least, another interesting question that 
can be explored is to analyze the managerial compensation schemes (structures) for 
the firms providing voluntary disclosure. Broadly, such an analysis could also explore 
the various corporate governance structures at the organization level to get a better 
understanding of firm characteristics.  Such an analysis can provide further insights as 
to the motivation of why firms provide disclosures of information security related 
activities. 
7.3 Limitations 
As with all research, my research has its limitations as well.  First, as 
discussed throughout this document, the value-relevance model is a parsimonious 
description of an otherwise complex firm valuation.  Specifically, the model assumes 
a linear relationship between the firm value and explanatory variables.  It could be 




issue.  Every precaution is taken to mitigate these effects where robustness checks are 
conducted specifically to mitigate potential biases.   
Second, the disclosure variable might be noisy.  This noise could happen since 
I not only use textual information, but I am also focusing on a single source of 
information i.e., annual filings of firms with the SEC.  It could be that other firms 
might have disclosed in another medium or perhaps in some table format that was not 
identified.  For textual coding, the taxonomy was kept as simple as possible (0 or 1) 
to ensure consistency.  Also, for the pre-test sample, the disclosures were rated by 
three people to check the classification, and if there were any difference, they were 
reconciled.  Furthermore, one of contribution of the study is to identify a public 
source of data so that these results can easily be replicated.  I also checked press 
releases and firms’ annual reports (for the investors) to see the number of disclosures: 
consistent with the idea of security through obscurity, there were not many reports.   
Third, the implicit underlying assumption in all disclosures studies is that all 
voluntary disclosures are truthful.  Nevertheless, there are competitor deterrence 
models that might view disclosures as “cheap-talk” (Gigler 1994).  However, I 
anticipate that both reputational consideration and litigation costs will preclude firms 
from disclosing untruthful information.   
Fourth, the information security activities are time sensitive i.e., right now 
there is enormous attention for privacy and data protection issues.  Therefore, it could 
be the case that the results are due to the time-frame that was selected for analysis.  I 
specifically extended the time period to five years, especially to tweak out the affect 




My results consistently provide empirical support that information activities are value 
relevant.  Additionally, the annual returns analysis for the matched-pair design and 
industry analysis requires further evaluation.  One possible explanation for the return 
analysis in matched-pair design as compared to the all firms sample (Table 11) is that 
the power of the test could be weak.  Another possible explanation could be that 
disclosures of a voluntary nature are endogenous (Core 2001), and not controlling for 
this endogeneity might be the cause for lack of statistical insignificance.  For the 
industry analysis, the results (besides the above-mentioned reasons) could be due to 
the industry classification used in this research.  Currently the industry classification 
being used separates the full sample into 35 different segments (see Bhojraj et al. 
2003, Table 2 p. 757-759).  For example, previous research that has conducted 
industry membership analysis had used various industry memberships, ranging from 
nine groups (Wild 1992), to fifteen (Barth et al. 1998, p. 25 Table 5), to forty- seven 
industry classification (Lang and Lundholm 1996a).  Furthermore, Kenneth French of 
“Fama and French industry classification schema” (Fama and French 1997), lists 
industry portfolios that range anywhere from 49 to 17 classification schemes19.  
However, as noted in previous research, a finer partition of industry segments might 
make the sample size too small for individual group analyses.  Furthermore, since 
ordinary least square regression is particularly sensitive to extreme (influential) 
observations, it could be that significance or negative coefficients could be due to the 
granular partition.  For example, in the Automobile industry there are only three firms 
that disclosed (Table 5).  Also, the fact that the Household industry has a strong 
                                                 





negative and significant coefficient for vulnerability disclosures (Table 10) is based 
on three security disclosures that were made for the whole industry in the study 
period.  The above notwithstanding, it could be the case that for firms in certain 
industries, like Construction, the market looks at security investments as unnecessary, 
and are hence penalizing these firms.   
Last but not least, it could be that the assumptions on error terms for my 
analysis are being violated.  That is, since I am running pooled cross-sectional 
regression, it could be that error terms for firms are auto-correlated, besides being 
heteroscedastic.  If that is the case, then the standard error might be biased.  Thus, a 
feasible GLS model, or a random-effect model might be employed to further 
corroborate the robustness of my current findings. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Technology and telecommunications innovations have fundamentally changed 
the way businesses operate, and we are now in what is termed as an ‘information-
economy” that is characterized by ‘information’ as one of the firm’s critical assets.  
One of the unintended consequences of interconnectivity is that the organization’s 
network has become that much more vulnerable.  Although, organizations are 
actively involved in securing their digital assets, they face serious costs in disclosing 
such activities.  Compounding the issue, is the fact that recent security breaches are 
spurring more legislations that would further burden the firms who are already under 
a lot of pressure to comply with the existing laws.  Since information security 




is any economic benefit from such endeavors, or if it is just the “cost-of-doing-
business” in the new economy.  
This research is the first attempt to provide empirical support that security-
related disclosures, and indirectly information security activities, have economic 
consequences for firms.  Drawing on accounting literature of disclosures and using a 
sample of 1,637 disclosing and 19,843 non-disclosing firms-years in a cross-sectional 
pooled model, my main results provide support that security disclosures, in general, 
are significantly and positively related to stock price.  The result is robust to year-to-
year analysis with an interesting finding that magnitude of disclosures is highest in 
the first year of the sample.  For industry analysis, the effect is more pronounced in 
firms that are not only technology and data dependent, but have customer-facing 
operations.  The industry-wide analysis provides partial support to the disclosure 
proxy.  That is, if the proxy variable is a representation of firms that, in general, 
disclose more information (high-disclosers), then the dummy variable should be 
significant across all the industries.  Specifically, for the regulated industries (Banks 
and Finance), lack of significance for generic information security disclosures 
provides further support that my proxy is indeed reflecting the affect of information 
security activities disclosures.  Furthermore, the results are robust to various proxies 
for size and abnormal earnings, matched-pair design, and self-selection models. 
The research has both theoretical and managerial implications.  First, it adds 
to the debate on discretionary disclosure as a ‘signaling’ mechanism.  Whereas Lev 
and Penman (1990) concludes that there is no signaling effect, my sample shows a 




to the extant literature of value-relevance and voluntary disclosures of intangible 
assets.  The study provides empirical support that the market does recognize these 
voluntary disclosures, in general, and specifically the disclosures of proactive security 
measures are valued highly.  Finally, managerial implications are: 1) security 
reporting is better for firm value; and 2) indirectly, the results show that security 
activities have economic value for the firm.  However, as with all research, there are 
limitations.  Nevertheless, the dataset has rich information that will allow further 
refinements to the analysis, as well as address other interesting questions that could 





Example of Disclosures of Security Activities 
Actual Security Breach 
For example, approximately four percent of our customers experienced a brief 
delay in delivery of services on June 15, 2004 as a result of a denial of service 
resulting from an attack by hackers on our network. We believe this attack targeted 
several well-known websites that are customers of Akamai. Although we have taken 
steps to enhance our ability to prevent the recurrence of such an incident, there can 
be no assurance that similar attacks will not be attempted in the future, that our 
enhanced >>security measures>> will be effective or that a successful attack would 
not be more damaging. Any widespread loss or interruption of our network or 
services would reduce our revenues and could harm our business, financial results 
and reputation.  >>>>PAGE: 10>>> 
 
Filer: AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC            
Report: 10-K 
Date Filed: 3/16/2005 
Period: 12/31/2004 
 
….have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and 
financial condition.   We have security risks    On occasion, some experienced 
programmers (hackers") have attempted to penetrate our network security. We expect 
that these attempts, some of which have succeeded, will continue to occur from time 
to time. Because a hacker who penetrates our network security could misappropriate 
proprietary information or cause interruptions in our services, we might be required 
to expend significant capital and resources to protect against, or to alleviate, 
problems caused by hackers. Additionally, we may not have a timely remedy against 
a hacker who is able to penetrate our network security. In addition to purposeful 
security breaches, the inadvertent transmission of >>computer viruses>> could 
expose us to litigation or to a material risk of loss. Such security breaches and 
inadvertent transmissions could have a material adverse effect on our business, 
results of operations and financial condition.    In offering certain online payment 
services, we may increasingly rely on technology licensed from third parties to 
provide the security and authentication >>>>PAGE: 24>>> 
 
Filer: AUTOWEB COM INC 
Report: 10-K 





Proactive Security Measures 
 (j) Notifying D&B's risk management group of any security violation or 
unauthorized attempt to access or alter D&B data and escalating the issue in 
accordance with applicable D&B security policy guidelines and procedures.     (k) 
Conducting periodic reviews, as appropriate, to validate that individual employee 
access to programs, databases, and libraries is appropriate.     (l) Capturing data 
regarding routine access and exceptions for audit trail purposes, and making such 
data available to D&B upon request.     (m) Performing periodic security reviews, 
providing incident investigation support, providing copies of the report to D&B, and 
initiating corrective actions to minimize and prevent >>security breaches>>.     (n) 
Providing monthly reports on violation and access attempts, and retaining 
documentation of the investigation for a period of one (1) year.     (o) Providing 
security access control tools for data, software, and networks in compliance with 
D&B security policies, standards and procedures and maintaining such security and 
access control devices in proper working order.     (p) Establishing and administering 
p>>>>EX-10.43>>>>PAGE: 178>>> 
Filer: DUN & BRADSTREET CORP/NW      
Report: 10-K 
Date Filed: 3/14/2005 
Period: 12/31/2004 
 
> disclose nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties and 
affiliates;  annual notices of their privacy policies to current customers; and  a 
reasonable method for customers to opt out" of disclosures to nonaffiliated third 
parties.      Compliance with these rules was mandatory after July 1, 2001. San Rafael 
Bancorp and Tamalpais Bank were in full compliance with the rules as of or prior to 
their respective effective dates.      SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER 
INFORMATION.  Under Title V, federal banking regulators are required to adopt 
rules requiring financial institutions to implement a program to protect confidential 
customer information. In January 2000, the federal banking agencies adopted 
guidelines requiring financial institutions to establish an >>information security>> 
program.      Tamalpais Bank implemented a security program appropriate to its size 
and complexity and the nature and scope of its operations prior to the July 1, 2001 
effective date of the regulatory guidelines, and since initial implementation has, as 
necessary, updated and improved that program.      COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
ACT SUNSHINE REQUIREMENTS.>>>>>>Body of Filing>>>PAGE: 27>>> 
 
Filer: EPIC BANCORP         
Report: 10-KSB 







Many of our competitors have substantially greater resources to invest in 
technological improvements. We cannot assure you that we will be able to effectively 
implement new technology-driven products and services, which could reduce our 
ability to effectively compete.  Our hardware and software systems are vulnerable to 
damage that could harm our business.  We rely upon our existing information systems 
for operating and monitoring all major aspects of our business, including deposit and 
loan information, as well as various internal management functions. These systems 
and our operations are vulnerable to damage or interruption from natural disasters, 
power loss, network failure, improper operation by our employees, >>security 
breaches>>, computer viruses or intentional attacks by third parties. Any disruption 
in the operation of our information systems could adversely impact our operations, 
which may affect our results of operations and financial condition. 
Filer: YARDVILLE NATIONAL BANCORP                                   
Report: 10-K 




If hackers gain unauthorized access to our systems, we could suffer disruptions in our 
business and long-term damage to our reputation.       As an anti-virus company that 
delivers virus protection products over the internet, we may be more susceptible to 
problems caused by hackers than other software companies. For example, if hackers 
were able to cause us to transmit computer viruses or interrupt the delivery of our 
anti-virus software monitoring and security services over the internet, we could suffer 
substantial disruptions in our business and material damage to our reputation. This 
could result in a significant loss of our customers and other important business 
relationships. We could also incur costs for public relations efforts following attacks 
by hackers. >>Hacker>> activities could also force us to incur substantial costs to 
fix technical problems or result in hackers gaining access to our proprietary 
information.                      10 >>>>Body of Filing>>>>PAGE: 10>>> 
 
 
Filer: TREND MICRO INC                                            
Report: 20-F 









 Listing of Keywords used for Annual Filings 
 
Keyword No of Instances 
Security Measure*a                      2,211 
Authentication 1,823 
Encryption                             1,411 
Computer Virus*                        1,277 
Security Breach*                       1,209 
Disaster Recovery                      1,182 
Information Security                   937 
(Network Or Computer) Join(1) Security 906 
Access Control 595 
Intrusion                              573 
Business Continuity                    406 
Security Management                    224 
Hacker                                 204 
Security Monitoring                    188 
Denial Of Service                      158 
Cyber Security                         26 
Cyber Attack*                          19 
Security Incident                      16 
Infosec                                7 
Security Expenditure*                  7 
Computer System Security               3 
Cybersecurity                          3 
Computer Breach*                       2 
Computer Intrusion*                    1 
 








 Summary of Sample Selection Process 
 
      
 Number of Disclosing firms-years Percent  
Number of Non-Disclosing firm-
years Percent 
      
Total firm-years 2,479 129.38%  25,088 100.00% 
Missing Permno (563) (29.38%)   0.00% 
      
Firms identified 1,916 100.00%  25,088 100.00% 
      
Missing financial + outliers (274) (14.30%)  (5,340) (21.29%) 
Missing industry classification (5) (0.26%)  (265) (1.06%) 
      
Total Firm-Year sample 1,637 85.44%  19,483 77.66% 
      
      
Total sample size: Firm-years 
(Disclosing + Non-disclosing 









 Fama French Industry Classification  for Two Digit SIC Codes 
 
 
Panel A: Two digit SIC code mapping to Fama French industry portfolios 
 
Two-digit SIC Group Fama French Industry 
Classification 
 Primary Equivalent 
Two-digit SIC Group Fama French Industry 
Classification 
 Primary Equivalent 
01 Agric 45 Trans 
10 Gold 47 Trans 
12 Coal 48 Telcm 
13 Enrgy 49 Util 
14 Mines 50 Whlsl 
15 Cnstr 51 Whlsl 
16 Cnstr 52 Rtail 
17 Cnstr 53 Rtail 
20 Food 54 Rtail 
21 Smoke 55 Rtail 
22 Txtls 56 Rtail 
23 Clths 57 Rtail 
24 BldMt 58 Meals 
25 Hshld 59 Rtail 
26 Paper 60 Banks 
27 Books 61 Banks 
28 Drugs 62 Fin 
29 Enrgy 63 Insur 
30 Not Classified 64 Insur 
31 Clths 67 Fin 
32 BldMt 70 Meals 
33 Steel 72 PerSrv 
34 BldMt 73 BusSv 
35 Mach 75 BusSv 
36 Chips 78 Fun 
37 Autos 79 Fun 
38 LabEq 80 Hlth 
39 Toys 82 PerSrv 
40 Trans 87 BusSv 
42 Trans 99 Misc 
44 Trans   
 









Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Fama French industry description 
   
 Fama French Industry 
Classification 
 Primary Equivalent 
Description 
1 Agric Agriculture 
2 Gold Precious Metals 
3 Coal Coal 
4 Enrgy Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 
5 Mines Nonmetallic Mining  
6 Cnstr Construction 
7 Food Food Products 
8 Smoke Tobacco Products 
9 Txtls Textiles 
10 Clths Apparel 
11 BldMt Construction Materials 
12 Hshld Consumer Goods 
13 Paper Business Supplies 
14 Books Printing and Publishing 
15 Drugs Pharmaceutical Products 
16 Not Classified  
17 Steel Steel Works Etc. 
18 Mach Machinery 
19 Chips Electronic Equipment 
20 Autos Automobiles and Trucks 
21 LabEq Measuring and Control 
Equipment 
22 Toys Recreational Products 
23 Trans Transportation 
24 Telcm Telecommunications 
25 Util Utilities 
26 Whlsl Wholesales 
27 Rtail Retail 
28 Meals Restaurants, Hotel, Motels 
29 Banks Banking 
30 Fin Trading 
31 Insur Insurance 
32 PerSrv Personal Services 
33 BusSv Business Services 
34 Fun Entertainment 
35 Hlth Healthcare 
36 Misc Miscellaneous 
 









 Summary of Disclosures  
 
Panel A: Number of security disclosures by type  
Group Proactive Security 
Potential Security 
Vulnerability Actual Breaches Disclosures 
     
1 0 0 4 4 
2 757 0 0 757 
3 2 0 2 2 
4 0 374 0 374 
5 0 11 11 11 
6 1,258 1,258 0 1,258 
7 73 73 73 73 
     
     
Total (1) – (7) 2,090 1,716 90 2,479 
     
     
Panel B : Number of unique firms providing security disclosures  
     
No. of Disclosures Unique Firms Percent of total Cumulative frequency  
    
0 5,011 86.13 86.13 % 
1 398 6.84 92.76 % 
2 155 2.66 95.55 % 
3 139 2.39 97.90 % 
4 63 1.08 99.19 % 
5 52 0.89 100.00 % 
     
Total unique firms 5,818 100   










Table 5  
 
Summary of Disclosures by Industry 
 
  Non-Disclosers  Disclosers  Totals 
No. Industry No. of 
firms-years 
% of col.  No. of 
firms-years 








1 BusSv 2,257 11.58%  691 42.21% 23.44%  2,948 42.21% 13.96% 
2 Banks 2,884 14.80%  224 13.68% 7.21%  3,108 55.89% 28.67% 
3 Fin 1,305 6.70%  100 6.11% 7.12%  1,405 62.00% 35.33% 
4 Insur 744 3.82%  98 5.99% 11.64%  842 67.99% 39.31% 
5 Telcm 805 4.13%  91 5.56% 10.16%  896 73.55% 43.56% 
6 Rtail 370 1.90%  67 4.09% 15.33%  437 77.64% 45.63% 
7 Chips 1,192 6.12%  54 3.30% 4.33%  1,246 80.94% 51.52% 
8 Drugs 1,689 8.67%  53 3.24% 3.04%  1,742 84.18% 59.77% 
9 Whlsl 475 2.44%  41 2.50% 7.95%  516 86.68% 62.22% 
10 Trans 457 2.35%  39 2.38% 7.86%  496 89.07% 64.56% 
11 Mach 898 4.61%  34 2.08% 3.65%  932 91.14% 68.98% 
12 LabEq 1,042 5.35%  25 1.53% 2.34%  1,067 92.67% 74.03% 
13 Hlth 298 1.53%  22 1.34% 6.88%  320 94.01% 75.54% 
14 Books 158 0.81%  16 0.98% 9.20%  174 94.99% 76.37% 
15 Util 702 3.60%  14 0.86% 1.96%  716 95.85% 79.76% 
16 Fun 234 1.20%  10 0.61% 4.10%  244 96.46% 80.91% 
17 PerSrv 75 0.38%  9 0.55% 10.71%  84 97.01% 81.31% 
18 Clths 143 0.73%  8 0.49% 5.30%  151 97.50% 82.03% 
19 Meals 330 1.69%  6 0.37% 1.79%  336 97.86% 83.62% 
20 BldMt 403 2.07%  5 0.31% 1.23%  408 98.17% 85.55% 
21 Food 305 1.57%  4 0.24% 1.29%  309 98.41% 87.01% 




            
            
 
Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
 
            
  Non-Disclosers  Disclosers  Totals 
  No. of 
firms-years 
% of col.  No. of 
firms-years 








22 Misc 86 0.44%  4 0.24% 4.44%  90 98.66% 87.44% 
23 Toys 152 0.78%  4 0.24% 2.56%  156 98.90% 88.18% 
24 Autos 318 1.63%  3 0.18% 0.93%  321 99.08% 89.70% 
25 Enrgy 836 4.29%  3 0.18% 0.36%  839 99.27% 93.67% 
26 Hshld 61 0.31%  3 0.18% 4.69%  64 99.45% 93.97% 
27 Cnstr 198 1.02%  2 0.12% 1.00%  200 99.57% 94.92% 
28 NotClassified 173 0.89%  2 0.12% 1.14%  175 99.69% 95.75% 
29 Steel 257 1.32%  2 0.12% 0.77%  259 99.82% 96.97% 
30 Coal 31 0.16%  1 0.06% 3.13%  32 99.88% 97.13% 
31 Paper 202 1.04%  1 0.06% 0.49%  203 99.94% 98.09% 
32 Smoke 23 0.12%  1 0.06% 4.17%  24 100.00% 98.20% 
33 Gold 279 1.43%  0 0.00% 0.00%  279 100.00% 99.52% 
34 Mines 43 0.22%  0 0.00% 0.00%  43 100.00% 99.73% 
35 Txtls 58 0.30%  0 0.00% 0.00%  58 100.00% 100.00% 
 Total 19,483 100%  1,637 100%   21,120   
 






        
Table 6 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
         
Panel A: Full sample of firms 
    Percentile   
Variable Mean Min Max 25th 50th  75th  SD N 
         
         
Price -3 Mnth 17.40 0.09 100.95 4.31 13.13 25.70 16.27 21,120 
Earn per share 0.48 -10.87 9.31 -0.33 0.44 1.45 1.84 21,120 
Mkt Val 3,184.08 0.12 476,115.50 56.30 253.52 1,177.76 14,766.06 21,120 
Bok Val 1,229.41 0.07 152,027.00 36.04 131.42 556.06 4,989.33 21,120 
Asset 7,549.51 0.08 1,520,140.00 84.95 395.45 1,852.47 53,057.99 21,120 
Sharesout 112.97 0.34 10,586.36 9.81 25.22 61.88 413.37 21,120 
Q 3.09 0.01 827.94 1.10 1.79 3.04 9.06 21,120 
Ann Ret 0.14 -0.96 4.88 -0.28 0.07 0.40 0.71 20,518 
Turnover 0.59 0.02 1.07 0.34 0.61 0.87 0.30 21,120 
Volat 0.15 0.00 1.72 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.12 20,485 
Analys 5.75 0.00 62.00 0.00 2.00 8.00 8.18 21,120 
Inst Hold 0.36 0.00 2.52 0.09 0.30 0.59 0.29 19,093 
         
         
Panel B: Disclosing firms 
         
    Percentile   
Variable Mean Min Max 25th  50th  75th  SD N 
         
Price -3 Mnth 16.30 0.09 96.74 4.00 11.03 23.51 16.31 1,637 
Earn per share 0.14 -10.33 9.03 -0.55 0.16 1.11 1.89 1,637 
Mkt Val 4,608.28 1.54 250,277.90 99.28 371.42 1,634.09 17,477.24 1,637 
Bok Val 1,728.81 0.21 109,291.00 44.36 150.11 599.50 7,218.67 1,637 
Asset 17,067.36 1.94 1,484,101.00 82.59 336.25 1,775.06 103,733.90 1,637 
Sharesout 173.86 1.12 6,253.00 19.33 37.79 84.51 527.52 1,637 
Q 3.65 0.07 75.51 1.41 2.36 4.07 4.87 1,637 
Ann Ret 0.16 -0.96 4.88 -0.38 0.03 0.43 0.84 1,611 
Turnover 0.70 0.02 1.07 0.49 0.75 0.95 0.28 1,637 
Volat 0.18 0.01 1.64 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.14 1,609 
Analys 7.31 0.00 57.00 1.00 4.00 10.00 9.00 1,637 
Inst Hold 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.33 0.62 0.29 1,496 
         
         
         
         
         
         




         
         
Table 6 (Cont’d) 
         
         
Panel C: Non-disclosing firm 
         
    Percentile   
Variable Mean Min Max 25th 50th 75th SD N 
         
Price -3 Mnth 17.49 0.09 100.95 4.36 13.31 25.87 16.26 19,483 
Earn per share 0.51 -10.87 9.31 -0.31 0.48 1.47 1.84 19,483 
Mkt Val 3,064.42 0.12 476,115.50 53.71 243.64 1,134.14 14,509.37 19,483 
Bok Val 1,187.45 0.07 152,027.00 35.61 129.26 552.55 4,752.53 19,483 
Asset 6,749.80 0.08 1,520,140.00 85.28 402.09 1,860.14 46,258.14 19,483 
Sharesout 107.85 0.34 10,586.36 9.37 24.21 60.03 401.90 19,483 
Q 3.05 0.01 827.94 1.08 1.75 2.95 9.33 19,483 
Ann Ret 0.14 -0.96 4.86 -0.27 0.07 0.40 0.70 18,907 
Turnover 0.59 0.02 1.07 0.32 0.60 0.86 0.30 19,483 
Volat 0.15 0.00 1.72 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.12 18,876 
Analys 5.62 0.00 62.00 0.00 2.00 8.00 8.10 19,483 
Inst Hold 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.30 0.59 0.29 17,597 
         
 
Price – 3 Month  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close - $/share 
EPS = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - $/share 
Mkt Val = Equity market value of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end – Price fiscal year end * No. of shares outstanding 
Bok Val = Book value of equity for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - ‘000,000 
Sharesout = No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - ‘000,000 
Asset = Total assets of the firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ at year end - ‘000,000 
Q = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘I’ for year ‘t’ 
Annret = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Turnover                 = Shares turnover computed as [1-Πt(1-volume tradedt/total sharest)] 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Volat = Standard deviation of monthly returns, 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Analys = Number of analyst following for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ from I/B/E/S detail file 






Table 7  
 
Correlation Matrix for the Variables 
                
 PRC-3M EPS BV Shares MV Assets Q Annret Turnover Volat Analys Hold Dis Pro Vul 
                
EPS 0.60 1.00              
 (0.00)***               
                
BV 0.28 0.17 1.00             
 (0.00)*** (0.00)***              
                
Shares 0.17 0.08 0.77 1.00            
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***             
                
MV 0.30 0.16 0.83 0.86 1.00           
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***            
                
Assets 0.18 0.13 0.69 0.50 0.54 1.00          
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***           
                
Q 0.06 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 1.00         
 (0.00)*** (0.85) (0.05)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.16)          
                
Annret 0.23 0.21 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.04 1.00        
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.07)* (0.00)*** (0.23) (0.61) (0.00)***         
                
Turnover 0.13 -0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.04 1.00       
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***        
                
Volat -0.43 -0.44 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 -0.08 0.02 -0.11 0.24 1.00      
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.00)***       
                
Analys 0.45 0.21 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.17 0.04 -0.01 0.34 -0.14 1.00     
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.10)* (0.00)*** (0.00)***      
                
Hold 0.43 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.45 -0.18 0.51 1.00    
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.06)* (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***     
                
                




                
                
Table 7 (Cont’d) 
                
 PRC-3M EPS BV Shares MV Assets Q Annret Turnover Volat Analys Hold Dis Pro Vul 
                
Dis -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.03 1.00   
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.35) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
                
Pro -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.92 1.00  
 (0.06)* (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.60) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***   
                
Vul -0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.82 0.70 1.00 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.95) (0.01)*** (0.30) (0.81) (0.02)** (0.93) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.16) (0.00)*** (0.00)***  
                
Act 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.17 0.21 
 (0.89) (0.04)** (0.66) (0.67) (0.15) (0.38) (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.38) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
                
 
 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%, N = 21,120. 
 
Price – 3 Month  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close - $/share 
EPS = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - $/share 
Mkt Val = Equity market value of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end – Price fiscal year end * No. of shares outstanding 
Bok Val = Book value of equity for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - ‘000,000 
Shares = No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year-end - ‘000,000 
Asset = Total assets of the firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ at year end - ‘000,000 
Q = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Annret = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Turnover                 = Shares turnover computed as [1-Πt(1-volume tradedt/total sharest)] 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Volat = Standard deviation of monthly returns, 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Analys = Number of analyst following for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ from I/B/E/S detail file 
Inst Hold = Percentage of shares held by institutions for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ over total shares outstanding 
Dis = 1 if either Potential Vulnerability, or Proactive Measures or Actual Breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities, 0 otherwise. 
Vul = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability, 0 otherwise.  









Pooled Cross-sectional Stock Price Regression on Disclosure Proxies 
 
Pit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*BVPSit  +  α3*EPSit  + α4*Qit  + Σ αk∗Yearit + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
PRC – 3Mit = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = MV divided by BV of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach, 0 otherwise 
Yearit = 1 if current year, 0 otherwise 
Industryit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for year and industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




      
Dis  2.394  2.484  
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
Pro Msre (P)   3.054  3.157 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Ptn Vul (V)   1.491  1.636 
   (0.026)**  (0.019)** 
Actl Brch (A)   -1.237  -0.678 
   (0.796)  (0.888) 
PV   1.954  2.066 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
VA   0.527  0.758 
   (0.805)  (0.725) 
PA   1.639  2.261 
   (0.097)*  (0.030)** 
PVA   7.959  8.385 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
BVPS 1.034 1.038 1.038 1.076 1.077 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EPS  2.958 2.961 2.958 2.719 2.716 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Q 0.221 0.221 0.220 0.230 0.230 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
Intercept 4.116 3.984 3.989 4.300 4.305 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Obs 21,120 21,120 21,120 16,607 16,607 
Adjstd R2 0.584 0.585 0.586 0.574 0.574 









 Cross-sectional Stock Price Regression by Years on Disclosures Proxies 
 
Pit = α0  +  α1*Disit  + α2*BVPSit + α3*EPSit  + α4*Qit + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
PRC –3Mit  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise. 
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 
otherwise 
Industryit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
Panel A: Year-to-year regression on generic disclosures 
      
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
      
Dis 2.701 3.032 2.003 2.733 2.343 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
BVPS 0.945 1.134 0.911 1.105 1.092 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
EPS 2.637 2.608 2.556 3.682 3.974 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Q 0.778 0.352 0.316 0.334 0.098 
 (0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)*** 
      
Intercept 3.292 5.099 3.811 6.092 6.452 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Observations 4738 4376 4169 3983 3854 
Adjstd R2 0.558 0.542 0.598 0.637 0.639 
     
      
      
      
      
      
      




    
Table 9 (Cont’d) 
      
Panel B: Year-to-year regression on various types of disclosures  
      
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
      
Pro Msre (P) 4.045 5.159 1.027 3.141 3.136 
 (0.037)** (0.004)*** -0.258 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
      
Ptn Vul (V) 2.197 1.21 0.711 1.631 2.261 
 -0.394 -0.538 -0.562 -0.172 (0.092)* 
      
Actl Brch (A) 0 0 0 -0.161 0 
 (.) (.) (.) -0.966 (.) 
      
PV 2.17 1.751 2.555 2.389 1.866 
 (0.007)*** (0.064)* (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.014)** 
      
VA 4.392 2.706 3.622 -0.197 -4.011 
 (0.000)*** (0.003)*** -0.349 -0.814 (0.012)** 
      
PA 0 0 -0.978 3.067 0 
 (.) (.) -0.208 (0.000)*** (.) 
      
PVA 0.756 12.456 7.824 8.329 5.762 
 -0.524 (0.020)** (0.084)* (0.028)** -0.139 
      
BVPS 0.945 1.133 0.912 1.105 1.092 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
EPS 2.632 2.6 2.559 3.681 3.967 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Q 0.777 0.35 0.317 0.33 0.098 
 (0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)*** 
      
Intercept 3.296 5.11 3.798 6.106 6.461 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Observations 4,738 4,376 4,169 3,983 3,854 






     
Table 10 
 
Pooled Stock Price Regression by Industry on Disclosures Proxies 
 
Pit = α0  +  α1*Disit + α2*BVPSit +  α3*EPSit  + α4*Qit + Σ αk∗Yearit + εit 
 
PRC – 3Mit  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise. 
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
Yearit = 1 if current year, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for year variable is suppressed for readability. 
p-values for BVPS, EPS and Intercept are suppressed and only significance values are shown 
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; NS not significant 
             
Panel A: Stock price regression by industry on generic security disclosure 
 
 Disclosure  BVPS  EPS  Intercept  Q  N Adj R2 
Autos -0.786 -0.954 0.719 *** 4.418 *** 0.275   7.662 *** 321 0.603 
Banks 0.215 -0.688 1.098 *** 3.554 *** 4.314 *** -4.482 ** 3108 0.762 
BldMt -3.598 -0.55 1.093 *** 2.27 *** 1.266 *** 1.722   408 0.614 
Books 0.483 -0.874 1.038 *** 5.569 *** 0.359 *** 7.992 *** 174 0.717 
BusSv 2.006 (0.000)*** 1.408 *** 1.949 *** 0.612 *** 1.876 *** 2948 0.487 
Chips 1.588 (0.071)* 1.518 *** 1.42 *** 0.442 *** 1.602 ** 1246 0.637 
Clths 6.434 (0.012)** 1.275 *** 3.97 *** 2.361 * -2.515   151 0.728 
Cnstr -0.421 -0.761 0.795 *** 3.418 *** 2.117 ** 0.71   200 0.777 
Coal -0.215 -0.963 0.225   4.489 *** 0.227   23.264 *** 32 0.559 
Drugs 0.471 -0.767 1.317 *** 2.673 *** 0.227 ** 7.922 *** 1742 0.444 
Enrgy 2.724 -0.487 1.511 *** 1.828 *** 0.827 *** 2.237 ** 839 0.737 
Fin 1.02 -0.418 0.802 *** 4.228 *** 0.095 * 6.677 *** 1405 0.556 
Food 13.281 (0.013)** 0.777 *** 6.451 *** 0.578   6.862 *** 309 0.467 
Fun 0.352 -0.898 1.17 *** 2.701 *** 1.01 ** 3.907 ** 244 0.532 
Gold 0 (.) 1.564 *** 1.992 ** 2.406 *** -3.683 *** 279 0.709 
Hlth 5.768 (0.039)** 1.487 *** 4.165 *** 1.393 *** -0.309   320 0.663 
Hshld -14.459 (0.030)** 1.14 *** 1.914   2.738 *** -0.783   64 0.691 
Insur 5.049 (0.014)** 1.001 *** 2.268 *** 3.235 *** -1.409   842 0.665 
LabEq 2.246 (0.085)* 1.769 *** 2.907 *** 0.737 *** 2 ** 1067 0.598 
Mach 0.944 -0.482 1.127 *** 3.625 *** 0.672 *** 4.259 *** 932 0.63 
Meals 3.478 -0.308 1.002 *** 3.419 *** 1.163 ** 3.574 ** 336 0.541 
Mines 0 (.) 1.051 *** 3.798 *** 7.007 *** -6.732 ** 43 0.778 
Misc -8.347 (0.038)** 1.244 *** 1.17 *** 0.477   2.22   90 0.789 
Not 
Classified 0.929 -0.908 0.812 *** 3.905 *** 0.402 * 3.084 *** 175 0.674 
Paper 32.389 (0.000)*** 0.724 *** 3.445 *** 0.185   8.043 *** 203 0.418 
PerSrv 5.003 -0.372 0.544 *** 5.515 *** 0.438 *** 9.3 *** 84 0.435 
Rtail 4.502 (0.002)*** 0.718 *** 4.663 *** 0.393 *** 5.252 *** 437 0.568 
Smoke -8.994 -0.106 1.489 ** 4.892 * 0.036 ** 9.195 ** 24 0.662 
Steel -6.903 (0.033)** 1.28 *** 1.296 *** 3.398 *** -4.211 ** 259 0.67 
Telcm -0.443 -0.662 1.049 *** 1.755 *** 0.168 ** 6.246 *** 896 0.506 
Toys 3.065 (0.014)** 0.712 *** 4.407 *** 1.339 *** 1.336   156 0.676 
Trans 5.626 (0.002)*** 0.829 *** 2.2 *** 0.872 * 5.827 *** 496 0.477 
Txtls 0 (.) 1.118 *** 2.107 *** 9.224 *** -9.395 *** 58 0.865 
Util 0.128 -0.934 1.105 *** 2.316 *** 2.207 ** 1.38   716 0.671 






Table 10 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Stock price regression by industry on various types of security activities related disclosures 
Coefficients for BVPS, EPS, Q, Year and Intercept are suppressed for readability 
 P  V  A  PV  VA  PA  PVA  Obs Adj R
2 
Autos 11.067 -0.494 0 (.) 0 (.) -23.602 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 321 0.608 
Banks 1.264 (0.049)** -0.652 -0.655 0 (.) -2.124 -0.155 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 3108 0.763 
BldMt -3.029 -0.687 -5.826 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 408 0.613 
Books 0.739 -0.89 -5.061 (0.016)** 0 (.) 1.741 -0.65 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 174 0.714 
BusSv 3.333 (0.008)*** 0.873 -0.238 -5.632 0.356 1.479 (0.001)*** 3.929 0.649 4.217 (0.000)*** 7.403 (0.004)*** 2948 0.49 
Chips 0.8 -0.591 2.384 -0.119 0 (.) 1.371 -0.311 0 (.) 0 (.) 10.784 (0.000)*** 1246 0.636 
Clths 0 (.) 6.434 (0.012)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 151 0.728 
Cnstr -1.797 -0.121 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.98 -0.602 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 200 0.776 
Coal -0.215 -0.963 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 32 0.559 
Drugs 0.243 -0.905 6.466 -0.105 0 (.) -2.893 -0.236 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 1742 0.445 
Enrgy 2.724 -0.487 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 839 0.737 
Fin 0.594 -0.719 7.185 -0.231 0 (.) 0.492 -0.776 0 (.) 0 (.) 3.516 0.731 1405 0.556 
Food 15.227 -0.12 11.358 (0.026)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 309 0.465 
Fun 0.706 -0.781 -6.767 (0.047)** 0 (.) -4.046 (0.077)* 0 (.) 0 (.) 6.162 -0.335 244 0.529 
Gold 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 279 0.709 
Hlth 0.041 -0.99 37.947 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 6.788 (0.037)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 320 0.674 
Hshld -14.459 (0.030)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 64 0.691 
Insur 5.238 (0.060)* -2.03 -0.139 0 (.) 7.907 (0.007)*** -1.499 -0.191 0 (.) 0 (.) 842 0.667 
LabEq -0.31 -0.906 6.424 (0.011)** 0 (.) 2.552 (0.068)* 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 1067 0.598 
Mach 1.456 -0.711 0.894 -0.778 12.731 (0.198) 0.461 -0.757 0 (.) 0 (.) -1.758 -0.542 932 0.629 
Meals 7.269 -0.173 -4.71 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 3.754 -0.415 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 336 0.539 
Mines 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 43 0.778 
Misc 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) -8.347 (0.038)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 90 0.789 
Not 
Classified -18.595 (0.057)* 10.367 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 175 0.681 
Paper 0 (.) 32.389 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 203 0.418 




                 
                 
Table 10 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Stock price regression by industry on various types of security activities related disclosures 
                 
 P  V  A  PV  VA  PA  PVA  Obs Adj R
2 
                 
PerSrv 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 6.307 -0.292 -6.569 (0.031)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 84 0.435 
Rtail 1.226 -0.465 -7.388 -0.297 0 (.) 6.216 (0.001)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 437 0.573 
Smoke -8.994 -0.106 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 24 0.662 
Steel -3.661 -0.234 0 (.) 0 (.) -10.104 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 259 0.669 
Telcm -5.458 0.106 -0.673 0.756 -6.354 0.549 0.666 0.675 0.961 0.840 
-
0.198 0.985 0 (.) 896 0.505 
Toys 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 3.065 (0.014)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 156 0.676 
Trans 5.855 (0.000)*** 2.77 -0.418 0 (.) 6.811 -0.154 0 (.) 0 (.) 14.582 (0.000)*** 496 0.476 
Txtls 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 58 0.865 
Util 0.128 -0.934 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 716 0.671 









Pooled Cross-sectional Stock Returns Regression on Disclosure Proxies 
 
Annretit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*EPSSit  +  α3*∆EPSit  + α4*∆Qit   + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
Annretit = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
EPSSit = Earnings per share for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, scaled by previous year-end EPS 
∆EPSSit = Change in EPSt-EPSt-1 scaled by previous year beginning EPS for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
∆Qit = Changes in Q (MVt/BVt) for each firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’,  
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach, 0 otherwise 
Industryit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




      
Dis  0.079  0.117  
  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  
Pro Msre (P)   0.026  0.107 
   (0.466)  (0.044)** 
Ptn Vul (V)   0.133  0.156 
   (0.031)**  (0.020)** 
Actl Brch (A)   0.895  0.899 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
PV   0.075  0.085 
   (0.026)**  (0.024)** 
VA   -0.012  -0.009 
   (0.947)  (0.958) 
PA   -0.138  -0.133 
   (0.722)  (0.731) 
PVA   0.431  0.438 
   (0.018)**  (0.016)** 
EPSS -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.661) (0.688) (0.697) (0.560) (0.557) 
∆EPSS  0.066 0.066 0.066 0.062 0.062 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
∆Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.626) (0.626) (0.626) (0.655) (0.656) 
Intercept 0.160 0.154 0.154 0.126 0.126 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Obs 18,838 18,838 18,838 14,715 14,715 
Adjstd R2 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.023 0.023 








Pooled Cross-sectional Matched-Pair Stock Price Regression on 
Disclosure Proxies 
 
Pit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*BVPSit  +  α3*EPSit  + α4*Qit  + Σ αk∗Yearit + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
PRC–3Mit  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach, 0 otherwise 
Yearit = 1 if current year, 0 otherwise 
Indusit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for year and industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




      
Dis  1.176  1.443  
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
Pro Msre (P)   1.338  1.659 
   (0.021)**  (0.030)** 
Ptn Vul (V)   0.335  0.551 
   (0.626)  (0.443) 
Actl Brch (A)   -1.090  -0.613 
   (0.806)  (0.893) 
PV   1.015  1.248 
   (0.018)**  (0.007)*** 
VA   0.922  0.954 
   (0.648)  (0.647) 
PA   2.102  2.488 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
PVA   6.085  6.549 
   (0.005)***  (0.003)*** 
BVPS  1.247 1.246 1.254 1.253 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EPS   2.750 2.743 2.553 2.545 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Q  0.578 0.571 0.544 0.536 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Intercept  3.540 3.606 3.358 3.432 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Obs  3,274 3,274 2,626 2,626 
Adjstd R2  0.624 0.625 0.583 0.584 








Pooled Cross-sectional Matched-Pair Stock Returns Regression on 
Disclosure Proxies 
 
Annretit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*EPSSit  +  α3*∆EPSit  + α4*∆Qit  + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
Annretit = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after  
EPSSit = Earnings per share for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, scaled by previous year-end EPS 
∆EPSSit = Change in EPSt-EPSt-1 scaled by previous year beginning EPS for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
∆Qit = Changes in Q (MVt/BVt) for each firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’,  
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach, 0 otherwise 
Indusit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




      
Dis  0.008  0.014  
  (0.790)  (0.697)  
Pro Msre (P)   -0.013  0.027 
   (0.763)  (0.652) 
Ptn Vul (V)   0.057  0.063 
   (0.384)  (0.376) 
Actl Brch (A)   0.765  0.764 
   (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
PV   -0.012  -0.028 
   (0.744)  (0.518) 
VA   -0.139  -0.139 
   (0.425)  (0.427) 
PA   -0.274  -0.274 
   (0.510)  (0.511) 
PVA   0.304  0.300 
   (0.102)  (0.107) 
EPSS  -0.041 -0.040 -0.043 -0.043 
  (0.020)** (0.026)** (0.017)** (0.020)** 
∆EPSS   0.114 0.112 0.118 0.117 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
∆Q  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.095)* (0.100)* (0.092)* (0.099)* 
Intercept  0.172 0.172 0.160 0.160 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
Obs  2,834 2,834 2,254 2,254 
Adjstd R2  0.021 0.023 0.021 0.023 






     
Table 14 
 
Pooled Stock Return Regression by Industry on Disclosures Proxies 
 
Annretit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*EPSSit  +  α3*∆EPSit  + α4*∆Qit  + εit 
 
Annretit = Annual return of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, cumulated 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after  
EPSSit = Earnings per share for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, scaled by previous year-end EPS 
∆EPSSit = Change in EPSt-EPSt-1 scaled by previous year beginning EPS for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
∆Qit = Changes in Q (MVt/BVt) for each firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’,  
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
 
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
             
Panel A: Annual returns regression by industry on generic security disclosure 
 
 Disclosure  EPSS  ∆EPS  ∆Q  Intercept  N Adj R2 
Autos 0.175 -0.803 0.689 *** -0.329 NS 0.004 NS 0.17 *** 298 0.032 
Banks 0.002 -0.961 -0.034 NS 0.328 ** 0.155 *** 0.241 *** 2832 0.145 
BldMt -0.223 -0.329 -0.114 NS 0.341 NS 0.053 NS 0.202 *** 387 0.086 
Books -0.208 -0.16 0.139 ** -0.153 ** 0.007 NS 0.082 * 160 0.028 
BusSv 0.169 (0.000)*** -0.005 NS 0.026 * 0.002 NS -0.004 NS 2542 0.014 
Chips 0.164 -0.122 -0.161 ** 0.322 *** 0.02 ** 0.034 NS 1092 0.077 
Clths -0.082 -0.525 0.358 *** 0.127 ** 0.193 *** 0.227 *** 136 0.223 
Cnstr -0.191 -0.532 0.436 NS 0.324 NS 0.039 NS 0.26 *** 182 0.088 
Coal -0.05 -0.955 -0.728 NS 1.654 ** 0.057 * 0.759 *** 24 0.22 
Drugs 0.09 -0.534 -0.364 *** 0.306 *** 0.006 *** 0.067 *** 1525 0.036 
Enrgy -0.065 -0.923 0.121 ** 0.141 ** 0.035 *** 0.295 *** 751 0.06 
Fin -0.085 -0.297 0.138 NS 0.205 ** 0.009 *** 0.237 *** 1291 0.07 
Food 0.015 -0.877 1.261 *** 0.549 NS 0.004 NS 0.139 *** 277 0.142 
Fun 0.162 -0.581 0.22 * -0.268 NS 0.05 ** 0.234 *** 213 0.061 
Gold 0 (.) 0.019 NS 0.092 NS 0.261 *** 0.278 *** 217 0.211 
Hlth -0.062 -0.648 -0.26 NS 0.476 NS 0.134 *** 0.341 *** 290 0.165 
Hshld 0.588 (0.000)*** -0.38 NS 1.431 *** 0.128 *** 0.209 *** 61 0.523 
Insur 0.03 -0.573 0.179 NS 0.094 ** 0.112 ** 0.173 *** 769 0.123 
LabEq 0.256 -0.28 -0.273 ** 0.347 *** 0.002 NS 0.097 *** 929 0.029 
Mach 0.206 -0.189 -0.034 NS 0.097 NS 0.012 * 0.09 *** 867 0.031 
Meals 0.569 (0.065)* -0.246 ** 0.292 ** 0.022 NS 0.172 *** 304 0.072 
Mines 0 (.) 0.96 ** -0.476 NS 0.519 *** 0.147 ** 38 0.518 
Misc 0 (.) 0.148 *** -0.05 NS 0.059 ** 0.004 NS 67 0.126 
Not 
Classified 0.043 -0.939 0.419 *** 0.031 NS 0.138 ** 0.124 *** 157 0.156 
Paper -0.006 -0.989 -0.505 *** 0.852 *** 0.002 NS 0.121 *** 188 0.259 
PerSrv -0.078 -0.77 0.526 * 0.315 * 0.008 NS 0.219 ** 75 0.078 
Rtail 0.117 -0.403 -0.01 NS 0.111 * 0.016 NS 0.257 *** 394 0.028 
Smoke 4.092 (0.000)*** 5.048 *** -0.155 NS -0.007 NS -0.011 NS 21 0.697 
Steel -0.332 (0.000)*** 0.317 *** -0.11 *** 0.44 *** 0.236 *** 241 0.292 
Telcm 0.209 (0.024)** -0.016 NS 0.101 * 0 *** -0.068 *** 714 0.039 
Toys -0.189 -0.291 0.618 *** 0.179 NS 0.139 *** 0.165 *** 144 0.206 
Trans -0.068 -0.362 0.218 NS 0.528 *** 0.036 * 0.264 *** 457 0.165 
Txtls 0 (.) 0.803 * -0.297 NS 0.599 *** 0.176 ** 53 0.316 
Util -0.055 -0.61 0.615 *** 0.335 *** 0.062 NS 0.142 *** 672 0.156 
Whlsl -0.006 -0.963 -0.017 NS 0.157 ** 0.008 NS 0.217 *** 470 0.02 






Table 14 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Annual returns regression by industry on various types of security activities related disclosures 
Coefficients for EPSS, ∆EPSS, ∆Q, and Intercept are suppressed for readability 
 P  V  A  PV  VA  PA  PVA  Obs Adj R
2 
Autos 0.175 -0.803 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 298 0.032 
Banks -0.058 (0.067)* 0.09 -0.274 0 (.) 0.131 (0.011)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 2832 0.148 
BldMt -0.239 -0.465 -0.162 -0.803 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 387 0.083 
Books 0.17 -0.382 -0.019 -0.952 0 (.) -0.527 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 160 0.043 
BusSv 0.209 (0.031)** 0.208 (0.033)** 1.409 (0.022)** 0.117 (0.017)** 0 (.) 0.416 -0.631 0.467 (0.001)*** 2542 0.016 
Chips 0.087 -0.715 0.371 -0.15 0 (.) 0.119 -0.496 0 (.) 0 (.) -0.06 -0.944 1092 0.075 
Clths 0 (.) -0.082 -0.525 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 136 0.223 
Cnstr -0.597 -0.43 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.229 -0.766 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 182 0.086 
Coal -0.05 -0.955 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 24 0.22 
Drugs 0.056 -0.801 0.275 -0.455 0 (.) 0.021 -0.915 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 1525 0.035 
Enrgy -0.065 -0.923 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 751 0.06 
Fin -0.187 (0.096)* -0.126 -0.558 0 (.) -0.017 -0.885 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 1291 0.07 
Food 0.067 -0.65 -0.036 -0.764 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 277 0.139 
Fun 0.115 -0.769 0.115 -0.831 0 (.) -0.39 -0.608 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.577 -0.284 213 0.052 
Gold 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 217 0.211 
Hlth 0.167 -0.574 0.243 -0.772 0 (.) -0.241 -0.327 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 290 0.163 
Hshld 0.588 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 61 0.523 
Insur 0.048 -0.491 -0.075 -0.59 0 (.) 0.028 -0.764 0.397 -0.386 0 (.) 0 (.) 769 0.121 
LabEq -0.201 -0.267 0.007 -0.96 0 (.) 0.616 -0.129 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 929 0.031 
Mach 0.785 (0.017)** -0.244 -0.638 0.346 -0.636 0.007 -0.966 0 (.) 0 (.) 1.028 (0.048)** 867 0.036 
Meals 1.175 (0.094)* 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.379 -0.334 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 304 0.072 
Mines 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 38 0.518 
Misc 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) -8.347 (0.038)** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 67 0.126 
Not 
Classified -18.595 (0.057)* 10.367 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 157 0.156 
Paper 0 (.) 32.389 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 188 0.259 




                 
                 
Table 14 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Annual returns regression by industry on various types of security activities related disclosures 
                 
 P  V  A  PV  VA  PA  PVA  Obs Adj R
2 
                 
PerSrv 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.011 -0.969 -0.615 -0.365 0 (.) 0 (.) 75 0.075 
Rtail 0.136 -0.481 1.041 -0.18 0 (.) 0.065 -0.707 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 394 0.028 
Smoke 4.092 (0.000)*** 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 21 0.697 
Steel -0.321 -0.668 0 (.) 0 (.) -0.344 -0.646 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 241 0.289 
Telcm -0.05 -0.829 0.23 -0.115 0.452 -0.487 0.27 (0.009)*** 0.157 -0.59 -0.666 -0.306 0 (.) 714 0.037 
Toys 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) -0.189 -0.291 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 144 0.206 
Trans -0.056 -0.702 -0.064 -0.746 0 (.) -0.116 -0.53 0 (.) 0 (.) 0.21 -0.716 457 0.16 
Txtls 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 53 0.316 
Util -0.055 -0.61 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 672 0.156 
Whlsl -0.271 -0.27 -0.076 -0.843 0 (.) 0.137 -0.417 -0.426 -0.58 0 (.) 0.109 -0.841 470 0.016 









Treatment Regression of Stock Price on Disclosure Proxies 
 
Dit = γ0 + γ1*Logastit + γ2*ROAIT + γ3*CIit + γ4*Volatit + γ5∗Turnoverit + γ6∗Holdit + γ7∗Analit + Σ αj∗Indusit + υit 
 
Pit = α0  +  α1*Disit  +  α2*BVPSit  +  α3*EPSit  + α4*Qit  + α5∗Millsit +Σ αk∗Yearit + Σ αj∗Indusit + εit 
 
Logastit = Log of total assets of the firm ‘i’ for yeat ‘t’, at year end 
ROAit = Operating income bfre extraordn. items / assets for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
CIit = Long terms assets / assets for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, at year end 
Volatit = Standard deviation of monthly returns, 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Tunroverit = Shares turnover as [1-Πt(1-volume tradedt/total sharest)] 9 mnths before ‘t’ to 3 mnths after ‘t’ 
Holdit = Percentage of shares held by institutions for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ over total shares outstanding 
Analytit = Number of analyst following for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ from I/B/E/S detail file 
PRC – 3M it  = Stock price of firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, 90 days after fiscal year close 
EPSit = Earnings per share (basic excluding special items ) for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
BVPSit = Book value of equity divided by No. of shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’, year-end 
Qit = Ratio of Mkt Val / Bok Val for firm ‘i’ for year ‘t’ 
Millsit = Inverse Mills Ratio for each firm estimated from the first stage (i.e., disclosure Eq.) 
Disit = 1 if either potential vulnerability, or proactive measures or actual breach equals 1, 0 otherwise.  
Pro Msre (P) = 1 for a disclosure of proactive security activities only, 0 otherwise. 
Ptn Vul (V) = 1 for a disclosure of vulnerability only, 0 otherwise.  
Actl Brch  (A) = 1 if there is a report of actual security incident only, 0 otherwise 
PV = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and potential vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
VA = 1 for joint disclosure of potential vulnerability and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PA = 1 for joint disclosure of proactive security and actual security breach, 0 otherwise 
PVA = 1 for joint disclosures of proactive security measures, potential vulnerability and actual security 
breach, 0 otherwise 
Yearit = 1 if current year, 0 otherwise 
Indusit =1 if current industry, 0 otherwise 
Coefficient for year and industry variables are suppressed   
p-values in parentheses are heteroscedastic corrected values 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
      
Panel A: Regression on generic security disclosure controlling for selection 
      
 First Stage    Price Model  
Logasset 0.037 0.000***    
ROA -0.096 0.070*    
CI -0.521 0.000***    
Volat 0.043 0.774    
Turnover 0.722 0.000***    
Hold -0.225 0.001***    
Analys 0.006 0.010***    
      
Dis    36.691 0.000*** 
EPS    3.192 0.000*** 
BVPS    1.015 0.000*** 
Q    0.213 0.000*** 
Mills ratio    -18.315 0.000*** 
Intercept -2.908 0.000  3.526 0.000*** 
      
Obs  17,690   17,690 
LR chi2(41) 1,503     
Prob > chi2 0.0000     
Pseudo R2 0.1495     
Log Likehood -4,274     
Adjstd R2     0.5911 







        
        
        
Table 15 (Cont’d) 
        
Panel B: Treatment regression on individual types of security disclosure controlling for selection 
        
        
P 79.29       
 0.000***       
        
V  33.63      
  0.000***      
        
A   -45.05     
   0.275     
        
PV    27.01    
    0.000***    
        
VA     -67.47   
     0.000***   
        
PA      82.30  
      0.053*  
        
PVA       95.74 
       0.000*** 
        
EPS 3.12 3.19 3.19 3.22 3.19 3.18 3.17 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
        
BVPS 0.99 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
        
Q 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
        
Mills -33.88 -13.41 14.41 -12.79 26.06 -27.12 -34.93 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.296 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.049 0.000*** 
        
Intercept 3.86 3.63 3.65 3.51 3.69 3.65 3.72 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
        




22,281.34   23,862.74  24,084.31  
 
21,568.36  
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjstd R2 0.5899 0.5783 0.5777 0.5818 0.5781 0.5777 0.5812 
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